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
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the cover

The Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese theory and practice of revolutionary warfare are analyzed and differentiated by Dr. Charles A. Russell and Major Robert E. Hildner in their lead article, "Revolutionary War." Other insights behind the iron and bamboo curtains are provided by Captain Richard J. Erickson's "Development of the Strategy of Peaceful Coexistence during the Khrushchev Era" and by Dr. Kenneth R. Whiting's "A Quarter Century of Frustration-Sino-American Relations, 1944-1969."

REVOLUTIONARY WAR



A Comparison of Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese Strategy and Tactics

DR. CHARLES A. RUSSELL

MAJOR ROBERT E. HILDNER

IN MARCH 1972, North Vietnamese forces launched a massive invasion of South Vietnam which signaled a dramatic increase in the tempo and ferocity of a war that many believed to be in its final hours. The offensive represented a determined effort to effect a North Vietnamese victory, either militarily or politically, and was characterized by the unprecedented use of conventional military forces. To many Americans, the employment of conventional forces and modern sophisticated weap-

onry was surprising since the war in Vietnam has long been regarded by them as essentially a guerrilla war against ill-equipped and relatively lightly armed peasants who were sustained by a stubbornness and dedication bordering on fanaticism. However, to the student of insurgency and revolutionary warfare, the invasion and use of conventional forces was viewed as a logical and predictable result of the strategy and tactics of "protracted war" advocated by Mao Tse-tung in his writings on guerrilla warfare.¹

Many such students equate overall North Vietnamese strategy and tactics to those of the Communist Chinese and fail to realize that, while the North Vietnamese indeed were heavily influenced by the Chinese, there are significant and extremely important differences between the two in both strategy and tactics. Thus, we believe it useful to compare the Chinese and North Vietnamese theories of revolutionary war as a means not only of evaluating the current situation in Southeast Asia but also, hopefully, of projecting future developments.

The Chinese View

Formed in the war against Japan and refined during her subsequent civil war, Communist China's doctrine on the use of revolutionary warfare is spelled out clearly in the various writings of Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao. The Chinese see their political and military theories as a valuable weapon for use by underdeveloped states in eliminating political or economic domination by the industrialized West and as particularly applicable to the revolutionary efforts of colonial and semicolonial nations today.

theoretical basis and geographic focus of the revolution

Rooted in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of "just" war, Chinese theorists see those wars of national liberation initiated by oppressed peoples in colonial and semicolonial countries as just conflicts aimed at eliminating internal feudal oligarchies and foreign political or economic domination. In such countries, cities are seen as the strongholds of imperialism. Controlling government and industry and effectively suppressing the growth of the proletariat, imperialism is almost invulnerable. In the countryside, however, where imperialist elements must rely on a weak feudal oligarchy to maintain control, the position is much weaker. There

imperialism can be attacked successfully through the use of revolutionary warfare. By concentrating forces in rural base areas and gradually building their political, military, and economic strength, the countryside can eventually surround the cities, crushing imperialism and eliminating foreign control.²

For the Chinese, revolutionary activity within the underdeveloped world is a two-stage process. The initial phase of new democratic revolutions is that through which most colonial and semicolonial states are now passing. Led by the Communist party, a united front composed of the peasantry, small bourgeoisie, and the proletariat can—using the tactics of guerrilla warfare—achieve victory over imperialism externally and feudalism internally. Only later can a transition to socialism be achieved. In the united front, the peasantry is by far the most significant element. Readily accepting Communist control, it forms the bulk of the revolutionary forces. Since the focus of revolutionary activity is the underdeveloped world and within it the rural areas of any given nation, peasant support is essential to the success of the revolutionary effort. To insure this support, an extensive program of agrarian reform is critical. Equally critical is the continued political indoctrination of all revolutionary forces, from the common soldier or peasant upward. Such indoctrination is important in building the revolutionary spirit which Mao considers so vital in helping the materially inferior guerrillas conquer the better-armed forces of imperialism.

revolutionary strategy

Strategically, the Chinese concept of revolution and revolutionary warfare is based on the doctrine of protracted war. For Mao this equates to a long and drawn-out struggle designed to gain time in which the revolutionaries can improve their military capability while awaiting a change in the international situation and/or the

internal collapse of their opponents. Essentially defensive, this strategy acknowledges the inability of the revolutionaries to achieve a quick military victory over the better-equipped forces of their opponents. Specifically rejecting the concept that roving guerrilla bands without ties to the peasantry can ever achieve success, much less victory, the Chinese strategy of protracted war calls for a retreat into the rural countryside, the establishment there of secure base areas, and the gradual buildup of insurgent economic, political, and military power.

For the overall strategy of protracted war, the concept of guerrilla base areas is fundamental to ultimate insurgent victory. Located in generally inaccessible rural regions far from any metropolitan centers, these areas function not only as launching platforms for attacks against the enemy but also as material supply centers, as training bases for the development of conventional military forces, and as focal points for political indoctrination activities. Perhaps more important, they also provide a means to form military fronts in the enemy's rear, subjecting him to continual harassment throughout the entire area he presumes to control. In this sense, base areas function and develop strategically in somewhat the same manner as a tumor within the human organism. As the tumor gradually envelops and destroys intervening tissue, so base areas link up with one another, overcoming enemy resistance and eventually destroying hostile forces by isolating them within the cities and other strong points. Finally, those conventional forces developed within the base areas combine, issue forth, and destroy the enemy municipal strongholds. As summed up by Mao, ". . . guerrilla warfare could not last long or grow without base areas."³

Three additional and interrelated concepts also are critical to the doctrine of base areas and the overall strategy of protracted war: the idea of space and time, the concept of offense within a defense, and the proper relationship between guerrilla and conventional forces.

For the Chinese Communists, geographic space is essential in the development of base areas and the implementation of protracted war. Without a large area wherein guerrilla forces may maneuver freely and thus gain time to establish base areas and develop the strategy of protracted war, effective guerrilla operations would be almost impossible. Since maneuver is as essential to insurgent survival as base areas, Mao seriously questions the possibility of organizing a viable guerrilla movement in any geographically small nation. The only possible exceptions to this general rule are in those cases where the forces of repression are weak and ineffective or the guerrillas receive substantial external aid.

Closely linked to a need for space is the necessity of developing an offensive strategy that can be carried out within an overall defensive posture (protracted war). In this context the Chinese appreciate full well that once the momentum of a guerrilla movement is blunted, any chance for ultimate victory has vanished. Accordingly, Mao continually counsels short campaigns of quick decision, brief tactical offensives within the strategic defensive, and a policy of continual attack to exploit guerrilla mobility and flexibility. A static front is always to be avoided in favor of fluid, ever changing lines of combat wherein guerrillas continually seek out their opponents. Once having located them, they must strike swiftly, attacking at the most opportune time and point, and then withdrawing to attack again in another area. In short, while the overall strategy of protracted war is of necessity defensive, guerrilla tactics must always be offensive. To implement such tactics, however, both geographic space and base areas are essential.⁴

The third concept in protracted war, closely related to the ideas of geographic space and base areas, is the proper relationship between conventional and guerrilla forces. In contrast to the views held by many insurgent leaders, Mao Tse-tung is adamant on the point that guerrillas alone can never completely defeat an enemy.

Only conventional military forces can accomplish this: “. . . there can be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary importance because it is they who are alone capable of producing the decision.”⁵ Although insurgent units are of great importance and in certain stages of protracted war carry the burden of combat, their efforts are not decisive. Rather, they supplement regular units by harassing, weakening, and extending the enemy to the point where conventional forces can mount a concentrated attack and achieve final victory.

While the Chinese Communists view conventional military forces as essential to ultimate victory, they see these forces as a natural outgrowth of the guerrilla movement. For them, the insurgent cadres are a training ground where guerrillas can learn to operate in larger and larger groups, gradually assuming the status and operational patterns of conventional forces. To accomplish this, however, space for maneuver is essential, as are base areas where troops can be schooled in military doctrine and equipped for regular operations.⁶

stages and tactics of protracted war

Within Chinese revolutionary theory the growth of protracted war is a highly structured process, developed and carried to a successful conclusion through three separate and clearly defined stages. Each successive stage in such a war is not only a natural outgrowth of its predecessor but also a determinant of those tactics used in its development. Evolving in accordance with the laws of revolutionary warfare, the sequential development of the various stages is not subject to change, nor can the tactics of one be used effectively in another.⁷

Entitled “The Enemy’s Strategic Offensive—Our Strategic Defensive,” the first stage in protracted war is essentially defensive in nature. Characterized by a gradual withdrawal of revolutionary elements toward the interior of the country with the establishment there of secure base areas, preferably within moun-

tainous regions, the military balance of forces strongly favors the more powerful and better-equipped enemy vis-à-vis the weak, poorly armed, and often disorganized revolutionaries. Accordingly, the rebel tactics used in this phase of protracted war result, in Mao’s words, from the “objective conditions of the situation.” Since these conditions make it clearly impossible for the revolutionary forces to engage in conventional warfare, as they lack the equipment, training, arms, and even personnel for such operations, the only tactics left to them are those of revolutionary (guerrilla) warfare. The basic objectives of guerrilla operations, which constitute the primary form of combat in this first stage of protracted war, are to wear down the enemy gradually, erode his morale, extend his lines of communication, and weaken his forces, thus trading geographic space for time. Withdrawing slowly, the guerrillas constantly harass enemy units as they advance, counterattacking continually. Declining to fight pitched battles or engage in frontal assaults, the insurgents favor flanking attacks and the use of favorable terrain to ambush individual enemy columns. Substantial use also is made of multiple point assaults, wherein small guerrilla groups slow an enemy advance while larger insurgent cadres attack from the flanks and rear. Emphasizing mobility, swift advances and withdrawals, and the rapid concentration or dispersion of forces, guerrillas reject the concept of a passive defense for a continuing offense, thereby carrying out the Maoist dictum of always conducting an offensive strategy within the overall defensive posture of protracted war.

Following the fallback of insurgent forces to base areas within the interior of the country and enemy occupation of most urban areas, protracted war enters its second stage, the stalemate or equilibrium. Forced to operate at the end of overextended and vulnerable communication lines, exhausted by continual insurgent harassment, and without additional military resources, the enemy advance comes to a

halt. The attention of hostile forces is now focused on consolidating their positions, particularly within the urban areas. In a similar manner insurgent efforts are devoted to building and expanding base areas, increasing the political and military education of guerrilla cadres, and gradually building a conventional military capability. Although the primary form of combat remains guerrilla warfare, and the basic tactics utilized in phase one of protracted war still remain valid, this stage is characterized by a deliberate effort—beginning at the platoon level—to regularize insurgent forces, upgrading their equipment, size, and operational capability. Gradually, larger and larger units are combined for joint operations which now, in some cases, are conducted on a quasi-conventional level. Thus, the slow transition is initiated to change a heretofore totally guerrilla force into the nucleus of a regular military establishment. Integral to this process is the use of base areas to create the coordinated and unified command structure so essential for large-scale military operations.

The third and final phase in protracted war involves the development of an insurgent counteroffensive and the total destruction of all enemy forces. With the initiation of this stage, mobile warfare conducted by relatively large conventional units of regimental or divisional size characterizes the period. In this phase guerrilla forces play a purely secondary and auxiliary role in support of regular elements. Used primarily to harass enemy units—slowing their withdrawal, blunting a counterattack, cutting exposed communication lines, and wreaking havoc in their rear—guerrillas cooperate closely with regular elements of the revolutionary army. To insure such cooperation and provide maximum effectiveness on the part of insurgent groups, both forces normally operate under the direction of a unified command. Relying essentially upon conventional forces but also taking advantage of the extreme mobility possessed by guerrilla elements, Mao sees this combination as capable of ousting the enemy

from his urban redoubts and achieving victory.⁸

tactics of guerrilla units

As a result of the critical role played by guerrilla units in two of the three phases in protracted war, the creation of a firmly based and highly effective insurgent movement always has been a primary matter for the Chinese Communists. Convinced that ultimate victory in such a war is not possible without a guerrilla apparatus to function as a springboard for the later development of conventional military forces, both Mao and Lin Piao have devoted an important segment of their writing to a detailed discussion of basic guerrilla tactics and operations.

In their writings neither Mao nor Lin Piao seeks to outline in detail the actual mechanics of any given maneuver (ambush, assault, retreat, etc.). Rather, they search for those underlying factors that set aside the successful guerrilla unit from its less effective counterpart. In this analysis they identify four key factors that appear critical: aggressiveness, initiative, mobility and deception, and finally flexibility.

Central to all guerrilla tactics is the thesis that insurgent forces must never revert to a passive or defensive stance and allow the enemy to seek them out. A spirit of aggressiveness and a willingness to attack and repeatedly harass the enemy are vital to successful guerrilla operations. Exploiting a superior knowledge of the terrain and choosing the most advantageous time and place for any action, guerrillas must maintain a continuing assault against the enemy. Never should such operations be mounted without at least a 70 percent chance of absolute success or in a situation where the enemy's position is unclear. Also, at the point of attack the insurgents should normally have at least a six-to-one numerical superiority over their adversaries. Particularly effective operations are those carried out at night or under cover of fog or rain and directed against moving enemy columns. A small force slows the

column's advance, and larger insurgent elements then attack the flanks and rear simultaneously. Unable to retreat and attacked on all sides, the column is thrown into total disarray. Equally effective are ambushes wherein a hostile force is decoyed into terrain from which insurgents can suddenly open fire from concealed positions. Essential to these stratagems, however, are a spirit of combative aggressiveness and a ready willingness to undertake any risk that can result in damage to the enemy.

Closely related to the idea of aggressiveness is that of initiative. By initiative Mao means maintaining a constant control over any given battle or campaign. Only by making the first move in a combat situation and thereby forcing the enemy to react hastily can a guerrilla force keep an opponent off balance and incapable of mounting a coordinated antiguerrilla operation. Thus, initiative is essential for insurgent survival. The maintenance of such initiative, however, requires continued study and rapid exploitation of all enemy weaknesses, particularly his limited manpower, lack of knowledge of the terrain, and inadequate intelligence. By utilizing these weaknesses to the utmost, the guerrilla can maintain his freedom of operation and continually force an enemy into costly errors.

Mobility and deception also are closely linked with the concepts of aggressiveness and initiative. To a significant degree, mobility is the key to all effective guerrilla warfare. Without it the other tactical precepts of Mao and Lin Piao would be totally ineffectual. For the Chinese, mobility connotes an ability to concentrate and disperse forces with great rapidity. Thus, a numerically superior guerrilla unit focused at the point of an attack must be able to withdraw quickly and regroup in another area if plans or unexpected enemy resistance requires such action. Similarly, guerrillas must be able to mount a sudden and fierce attack on one enemy flank, quickly break off the assault, circle the enemy rear, and renew operations on another flank. In this way mobility also facilitates deception, deluding the enemy as to the

guerrillas' true strength, location, and intentions. When coupled with night attacks or those mounted in rain or fog or in conjunction with ambushes, mobility further heightens deception and the confusion of enemy commanders. In these operations the overall objective is to create a state of fluidity wherein battle lines are not based on the known location of two opposing forces but rather established and broken off at the discretion of the insurgents.

Flexibility, the final tactical precept stressed by both Mao and Lin Piao, actually refers to ingenuity. For survival and for success, the insurgent leader must be able to improvise, change plans suddenly, and even quickly alter prearranged tactics. He must not be bound by rigid military solutions or tactical considerations. Rapidly changing relationships between enemy and rebel forces make long-range or rigid tactical plans impossible to develop and execute. Accordingly, the insurgents must be able to make the most of every opportunity that presents itself, moving quickly to take advantage of each enemy miscalculation and error.⁹

The North Vietnamese View

Strongly influenced by Chinese theory, the North Vietnamese have adopted a doctrine on revolutionary warfare many aspects of which are strikingly similar to concepts formulated earlier by Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao. Tested in insurgent actions against the Japanese during World War II as well as in the anti-French campaigns of 1945-54, this doctrine has been further refined in Viet Cong operations against South Vietnamese and American forces. As a consequence of this continuous thirty-year struggle and despite their basic ideological debt to the Chinese, the North Vietnamese feel they have improved on many aspects of Maoist strategy and thereby created a unique body of strategic and tactical thought particularly ap-

plicable to guerrilla operations in small colonial and semicolonial nations.

theoretical basis and geographic focus of revolution

For the North Vietnamese as well as the Chinese, the theoretical basis for revolution is the Marxist-Leninist concept of a "just" war. In this formulation, struggles by colonial and semi-colonial nations to attain independence from foreign domination are just wars. Annexed to France, invaded by the Japanese, and later subject to a French colonial administration, the three-decade battle for Vietnamese independence fits perfectly the Communist criterion for such a war. In this conflict the repressive and "unjust" efforts of the French and Japanese imperialists were a failure. A similar fate (according to Communist beliefs) will meet the equally "unjust" American attempt. Since a just war is by definition a people's war, the revolutionary spirit of the populace, fostered and guided by the Communist party, cannot fail to triumph over even the most advanced technology of an opposing force. In such a conflict, imperialist forces will crumble and withdraw or suffer absolute defeat when they are met by the resolute and unending opposition of the people.

Although basing their revolutionary efforts on the just war concept, North Vietnamese theorists did not move on to adopt Maoist views concerning the inevitable conflict between rural and urban areas. While accepting the Chinese idea that future insurgent activity will be centered within the rural backlands of the underdeveloped world, they do not thereby automatically write off the revolutionary potential of the urban masses. Rather, they argue that the impetus for revolution can stem from the cities as well as the countryside and that the urban insurgent movement shares a coequal role with its rural counterpart. Thus, the North Vietnamese believe a revolution is developed and carried to success through the creation of rural base areas as well as strong and effective

urban guerrilla networks. In no case can one area be ignored at the expense of another.¹⁰

stages and forces of revolution

In the eyes of both North Vietnam and Communist China, revolution within the underdeveloped world is a two-stage process. The initial phase is a national democratic revolution aimed at freeing a nation from external domination and from the political/economic control exercised by indigenous feudal oligarchies. Only after these changes have taken place is a transition to socialism, the second stage, possible.

Although holding almost identical views on this revolutionary process, North Vietnamese and Chinese doctrines diverge in regard to the forces involved. Initially, Vietnamese theorists accepted the Chinese argument that a united front, led by the Communist party, must focus attention on the peasantry because of its quantitative strength and receptivity to party leadership. As a result of these factors, this group would become the primary revolutionary force. By virtue of its location in rural areas, these areas would be focal points for insurgent effort. Cities, as the home of the small bourgeoisie and proletariat (less important elements in the united front), should be abandoned in favor of the countryside.

While agreeing that rural areas and the peasantry would be important elements in future revolutionary activity, North Vietnamese leaders refused to ignore the military potential offered by city-based guerrillas or the idea that revolution could develop as easily in urban centers as in the countryside. By 1963 this opposing position had become official doctrine through the writings of North Vietnamese Communist party leader Truong Chinh. Chinh not only affirmed traditional Vietnamese stress on the importance of urban insurgency but went on to argue that the revolutionary impulse could develop *first* in the cities and from there flow outward to the countryside, a concept completely anathema to all Maoists. In

1966 these theoretical formulations were further strengthened by Vietnamese claims that the peasantry was incapable of playing a directive role in extended guerrilla operations. Instead, the urban working class under Communist leadership would be the leading element in this activity. With these ideological modifications to Maoist theory, the North Vietnamese not only showed the "creative nature" of their revolutionary effort but also provided a useful theoretical underpinning for their continued emphasis on the importance of urban insurgency.¹¹

While rejecting the single-minded Chinese emphasis on the importance of rural guerrilla warfare, North Vietnamese authorities are in full accord with Mao's stress on the significance of continuing political instruction for all guerrilla cadres. Convinced that motivated and indoctrinated insurgents can easily overcome an opposing force that is technologically superior but spiritually inferior, the authorities place great emphasis on political instruction at all levels of the insurgent structure as well as among the local populace within those areas controlled by the guerrillas. Without such indoctrination, revolution itself is impossible.

revolutionary strategy

In their overall strategic approach to revolution and revolutionary warfare, Vietnamese theorists are again strongly influenced by many of Mao's teachings. Adopting the Chinese concept of protracted war, which they refer to as a "war of resistance" or a "people's war of liberation," the North Vietnamese agree on the need for an extended struggle to break the spirit and backbone of their "imperialist" opponents.

Despite similar views on this subject, the Chinese and North Vietnamese disagree strongly as to whether viable base areas can be established within small nations, as to where such areas should be located if established, and as to the proper relationship that should exist between conventional and guerrilla forces. In regard to the matter of base areas and their

location, the Chinese advocate establishing these areas within the mountainous interior of a nation far from any urban centers. Since a large geographic area is necessary for this activity as well as for the war of maneuver so important to guerrilla success, Mao questions the possibility of creating viable base areas within any small nation. As such areas are absolutely essential for the development of guerrilla operations (in both the Chinese and Vietnamese views), Mao concludes that effective insurgent activity is generally impossible within a small nation.¹²

Seeing the Chinese as unduly influenced by geographic fatalism and an overemphasis on the strength of opposing imperialist forces, Vietnamese theorists argue that base areas can be established in small nations as well as larger ones. Further, in many instances they call for the creation of these base areas in regions contiguous to urban centers where revolutionary elements within the cities can be exploited effectively.

Implicit in the Vietnamese rejection of Chinese views on the location of base areas is a parallel downgrading of Maoist arguments regarding the need for permanency in these installations. According to both Mao and Lin Piao, base areas must be permanent, not transitory, and should be abandoned by insurgents only as a last resort. In contrast, the North Vietnamese view such bases as only semipermanent at best. Recognizing that local geography works against the creation of areas similar to the Chinese mountain redoubts, the Vietnamese see their bases as indefensible against a determined enemy assault. As Truong Chinh states, "No base can be absolutely firm . . . we must always have in mind the moment we may have to abandon it."¹³ Thus, as in the argument over establishing base areas or conducting effective guerrilla operations within a small nation, space appears to have played an important role in shaping both Chinese and North Vietnamese views on these aspects of revolutionary warfare.

In addition to disagreements on the nature and location of base areas, the Chinese and

Vietnamese are far apart on the relationship that should exist between conventional and guerrilla forces. For the Maoists, this relationship is a simple matter: regular military units are the key to revolutionary victory. Guerrillas, although important, are only auxiliaries to conventional elements. While they may bear the brunt of fighting during various phases of the conflict, insurgents alone can never attain a final and decisive victory. This can be achieved only by regular combat forces. In contrast to this Chinese distinction between the functions of guerrilla and conventional elements and to the paramount position accorded the latter, North Vietnamese doctrine views the two groups as coequal. Final victory is achieved not by the regular forces alone but rather through the joint and combined efforts of both groups.

While disagreeing on many aspects of protracted war ("war of resistance" in Vietnamese terminology), the guerrilla theorists of both nations are in total accord as to the need for maintaining an offensive strategy within the overall defensive posture of protracted war. On this point the writings of Mao, Lin Piao, Vo Nguyen Giap, and even Truong Chinh agree completely. Recognizing the basic posture of protracted war as necessarily defensive, since in its early stages most revolutionary elements are unable to defeat enemy conventional forces in open combat, guerrilla war is the principal alternative available to the revolutionaries.¹⁴

stages and tactics of protracted war

The North Vietnamese, like the Chinese, see protracted war as evolving in accordance with the laws of revolutionary warfare through three separate stages: the enemy offensive and the revolutionary defensive, a period of stalemate, and finally the revolutionary counteroffensive. From this point onward, however, Vietnamese and Chinese concepts diverge, particularly in regard to the tactics used in each stage of the conflict, the possibility of operating within separate stages in different parts of the country,

and finally the feasibility of moving backward and forward between the three phases.

By contrast, the North Vietnamese view is much less rigidly structured and more flexible. Within each stage it also reflects the strong influence exerted on national guerrilla strategy by North Vietnam's small size.

Overall, Vietnamese and Chinese views differ on two basic points: (1) the progressive and sequential manner in which the three stages of protracted war must develop and (2) the relationship between conventional and insurgent forces. For the Chinese, the movement from one stage to another in protracted war is a continuous and progressive process. Each phase is precisely delineated, and in passing from one to another this development is generally carried out at essentially the same time throughout the nation. If planned properly, the process is ongoing and does not involve a retreat from a more advanced stage to an earlier one. North Vietnamese theoreticians do not differentiate as precisely as the Chinese between the various stages in protracted war. Instead, they tend to see each stage merging into another without a clear-cut demarcation between the two. In addition, they do not believe a uniform development of the various phases is possible throughout an entire nation. Rather, one portion of the state may be involved in stage one, others in stage two, and a few in stage three. Additionally, areas that have advanced to the third stage may be forced back into a secondary or initial phase. Accordingly, the development of protracted war is not necessarily progressive or sequential. Instead, it quite probably will be sporadic and subject to innumerable retreats and deviations.

In the second major area of disagreement, Maoists clearly define the functions and roles of guerrilla and conventional forces, placing primary emphasis on the latter. In contrast, the Vietnamese emphasize strongly the guerrilla character of all military operations, advocate the use of mixed conventional and insurgent forces in *all* phases of protracted war, and even

endorse the use of roving guerrilla bands—a concept particularly repugnant to Mao.¹⁵

To a substantial degree these differences between North Vietnam and Communist China are further accentuated in the strategy and tactics advocated by each state for the three stages of protracted war. Whereas for stage one the Chinese urge a retreat to the countryside, the avoidance of positional warfare and pitched battles, an emphasis on guerrilla operations, and the creation of secure base areas in remote sections of the country, the Vietnamese have a substantially different set of plans. They recommend a dedicated defense of the cities by using positional warfare, the creation of guerrilla units to operate in these areas even after losing them, the predominance of mobile quasi-conventional warfare over insurgent operations during much of stage one, and finally the development of some base areas in close proximity to the cities. Again, geographic space appears to have played a significant part in Vietnamese modifications of Maoist doctrine.

During the second phase of protracted war (the equilibrium), Vietnamese and Chinese tactical doctrines again diverge, although not to the extent evident in stage one. For the Chinese this is essentially a period wherein base areas are expanded, conventional forces created, and the insurgent / military / economic potential developed. Guerrilla warfare, however, remains the basic military tactic for the period. In the Vietnamese view, however, although insurgent operations are still widespread, mobile warfare conducted by relatively large-scale conventional elements also is very important. In such operations conventional elements also work closely with smaller, purely guerrilla groups in the tactic that Truong Chinh refers to as an interlocking or mixed form of warfare. The total interdependence between larger units conducting mobile quasi-regular operations and the smaller guerrilla cadres, as well as the advocacy of positional and even siege warfare in this phase, is a significant departure from the Chinese concept

for phase two of protracted war.

The third phase in protracted war (the counteroffensive) also reflects a difference in North Vietnamese and Chinese views. To a significant degree this divergence seems to stem from the Vietnamese idea of interlocking or mixed warfare. While accepting the Maoist dictum that the counteroffensive is characterized by widespread use of increasingly larger conventional units, the Vietnamese do not go on to assign guerrilla cadres a purely auxiliary role as do the Chinese. Instead, even the conventional forces developed during phase two retain guerrilla characteristics and work hand in hand with purely insurgent elements. Nowhere in Vietnamese doctrine are the two types of military forces so clearly differentiated as in Maoist theory. Further, the counteroffensive does not, as Mao demands, become the prerogative of solely conventional elements, the forces he believes are alone capable of attaining final victory. Instead, for the North Vietnamese final victory results from a combined guerrilla and conventional effort with the former units playing an important role.

tactics of guerrilla units

In contrast to Chinese and Vietnamese differences over guerrilla strategy, basic unit tactics are quite similar for both nations. Following the Chinese lead, North Vietnamese insurgent theorists have focused attention on trying to isolate those factors responsible for success in small unit operations. From this analysis Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Le Duan, and others conclude, as did Mao earlier, that these factors may be summed up as aggressiveness, initiative, mobility and deception, and finally flexibility.

Although both the Chinese and North Vietnamese place equal stress on the first three factors, the Vietnamese seem to emphasize the importance of flexibility more than their Chinese mentors. Throughout the writings of General Giap and his teacher Truong Chinh, as

well as in captured Viet Cong documents, insurgents are continually admonished not to become rigid in their tactical thinking or tied down to prearranged plans. Instead, they are urged to improvise as the situation changes and learn how to shift from agreed-upon operational plans to less formalized courses of action.¹⁶

In summarizing Vietnamese views on the strategy and tactics of revolutionary warfare vis-à-vis those of the Chinese, one can perhaps best describe the Vietnamese position by the single word "adaptive." Although accepting the

Maoist strategy of protracted war as a basic strategy for revolution within the underdeveloped world, the North Vietnamese have moved quickly to adapt, alter, and tailor this concept to the realities of their own situation. These adaptations, in the words of General Giap, represent ". . . a wise and creative application of Marxist-Leninist principles on revolutionary war and revolutionary armed forces to the practical situation of a small, weak, colonial and semi-feudal country."¹⁷

*Hq Air Force Office of
Special Investigations*

Notes

1. For an excellent summary of such writings, see Dr. Ralph L. Powell, "Maoist Military Doctrines," *Asian Survey*, VIII, April 1968, pp. 239-62. For the text of Mao's military writings as set out in a single volume, see *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963).

2. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 136-43, 316-17.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 94; pp. 85, 93-99, 119, 133.

4. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, I (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 40-45, 199, 293.

5. Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 56.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 53, 55-56; Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, II, pp. 106-8, 229-30.

7. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, II, pp. 136-41, 172-74.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 140, 157-59; Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, I, pp. 159, 238-40.

9. For Mao's analysis of the concepts of aggressiveness, initiative, mobility and deception, and flexibility, see Mao Tse-tung, *Basic Tactics*, trans. Stuart R. Schram (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 55-66, 83-89, 270; Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, I, pp. 238-40; Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, II, pp. 85-87, 157-65, 170-74; Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, pp. 42-46, 98-105.

10. Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (New York: Bantam,

1968), pp. 22-30, 37-40, 60-61, 88-91; Le Duan, "On the South Vietnamese Revolution," *Vietnamese Studies: South Vietnam, Realities and Prospects*, ed. Nguyen Khac Vien (Hanoi: Xunhasaba, 1968), p. 11.

11. Le Duan, pp. 12-13; Truong Chinh, *Hoc Tap*, September 1963; Le Duan, "The Role of the Vietnamese Working Class and the Duties of the Labor Union in the Near Future," *Hoc Tap*, May 1967, in Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS) 41.648, *Translations from Hoc Tap*, June 30, 1967, pp. 9-35; Truong Chinh, *The Resistance Will Win* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), facsimile edition reproduced in Truong Chinh, *Primer for Revolt* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 147-49.

12. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, II, pp. 97, 99, 127.

13. Truong Chinh, *The Resistance Will Win*, p. 189.

14. *Ibid.*; Giap, pp. 40-44, 80.


15. Vo Nguyen Giap, *Big Victory, Great Task* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 55; Giap, *People's War, People's Army*, pp. 17, 24, 42-44, 91; Truong Chinh, *The Resistance Will Win*, pp. 139-42.

16. Mai Elliott, trans., *Documents of an Elite Viet Cong Delta Unit*, Part Three: "Military Organization and Activities," ed. David W. P. Elliott (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., RM-5850, 1969), pp. v, 63, 64; see also Truong Chinh, *The Resistance Will Win*, p. 181.

17. Giap, *People's War, People's Army*, p. 61.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE DURING THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA

CAPTAIN RICHARD J. ERICKSON



SEVERAL years ago a book appeared entitled, *The War Called Peace: Khrushchev's Communism*. The title of this work by Harry A. and Bonaro Overstreet aptly describes peaceful coexistence, a term fraught with implications of Orwellian newspeak that "war is peace" or, more to the point, "peace is war." It is the belief of George F. Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, that no term has been more loosely and at times more unscrupulously used than *peaceful coexistence*. It is the purpose of this article to examine this concept as it evolved during the premiership of Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Peaceful Coexistence as
a Treaty Principle

Peaceful coexistence was first introduced as a principle of international relations in the Chinese-Indian treaty of April 29, 1954. The preamble of that treaty set forth as the basis for intercourse between the two countries five principles:

- respect for territorial sovereignty and integrity
- mutual nonaggression
- mutual nonintervention
- equality and mutual benefit
- peaceful coexistence.

At the time, India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru referred to the "five principles" as *Pancha Shila*, a phrase he had acquired on his 1952 visit to Indonesia. Originally *Pancha Shila* referred to the five moral principles of the Buddhist religion relating to personal behavior, but the Prime Minister thought *Pancha Shila* apropos to state behavior.

The Soviets equated the five principles with peaceful coexistence, which was only one of the five. As Russell H. Fifield, Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, noted: "At any rate it is obvious that four widely accepted approaches to international behavior were combined with a fifth, peaceful coexistence, to become the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence."¹ If it is difficult to follow the reasoning of the Soviets (that, in effect, a part is equal to the whole), it is not difficult to understand the purpose behind their equation.

There is no evidence that either Nehru or Nu (of Burma) subscribed to the strict Communist interpretation. This did not, however, prevent Khrushchev from asserting at Bhakra-Nangal, India, on November 23, 1955: "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence proclaimed by Prime Minister Nehru and our friend Chou En-lai suit us perfectly."² How perfectly may be gleaned from a comment made by Wladyslaw W. Kulski, Professor of Russian Studies at Duke University, concerning the Sino-Indian treaty:

"It is both *ironical* and *ominous* that these principles were proclaimed for the first time in a treaty which recognized China's conquest of her colonial protectorate in Tibet."³ (Emphasis added.)

At the Bandung Conference (Indonesia) in April 1955, the five principles underwent modification and became the ten principles. Moscow was not pleased with the alteration inasmuch as a number of the new principles were directed against Soviet policy. Therefore the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the pro-Soviet world passed over and soon forgot the "ten principles of Bandung." The Soviet Union continued to speak in terms of the five principles as if no revision had occurred.⁴ When Nehru visited Moscow almost immediately after the conference, he signed a joint statement with the Soviet Premier in which the reference was to *Pancha Shila* rather than to the ten principles of Bandung.

Shortly before the XXth Party Congress of the CPSU convened in 1956, *International Affairs* (Moscow) reiterated that "in their statement of October 12, 1954, the Soviet and Chinese Communist governments said that they would base their relations with the countries of Asia and the Pacific Area on *Pancha Shila*."⁵ The article indicated that it was the intent of the Soviet Union to continue such relations with the emerging nations. This intent received formal acknowledgment at the XXth Party Congress where peaceful coexistence was considered at length.

The Concept of
Peaceful Coexistence

Before the XXth Congress, party ideologue Mikhail M. Suslov said: ". . . the foreign policy of the Soviet State worked out by our Party, has been carried out with strict adherence to principles and, at the same time, with maximum elasticity."⁶ The distinction which he was making was between strategy (the ideologi-

cal analysis valid for a historical epoch, which is constant) and tactics ("which depends on a judicious choice of the main battlefield in each strategic stage," which is, by its nature, flexible).⁷

Raymond L. Garthoff, a leading authority on Soviet military affairs, in *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (1958) offers a discussion of the concepts of strategy and tactics.⁸ Strategy, he points out, is of a higher order of generality than tactics and also of broader scope and longer duration. Thus, writes Kulski, "Tactical flexibility meant the ability to adjust the current policy to the existing circumstances, to what was possible at a given time."⁹ Tactics may best be described as "protracted conflict"—that is, "The enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue."—as defined by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and quoted and adopted by the Soviet leadership.

But peaceful coexistence, as Khrushchev told the XXth Party Congress, is "not a tactical move, but a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy."¹⁰ It is a strategy. In the Soviet view, peaceful coexistence is valid for "an historical epoch" more or less prolonged. It is on this point that the Communist Chinese disagree with the Soviet view. They view peaceful coexistence as a tactical maneuver. "To attain their aim of plunder and oppression, the imperialists always have two tactics: the tactic of war and the tactic of 'peace;' therefore the proletariat and the people of all countries must use two tactics to counter the imperialists. . . ." ¹¹ Peaceful coexistence is viewed as representing "the present stage of historical development." On occasion, peaceful coexistence has been referred to as "an historical inevitability."¹²

Seeking to claim historical continuity, Khrushchev made reference to "the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of countries. . . ." ¹³ Or again, "From its very inception," wrote Khrushchev, "the Soviet State proclaimed peaceful coexistence as the basic principle of foreign policy. It was no accident that the very first act of the

Soviet power was the decree on peace, the decree on the cessation of the bloody war."¹⁴ But Lenin viewed peaceful coexistence as a "temporary equilibrium," that is, as tactics. How did Khrushchev justify peaceful coexistence as a strategy? The answer is to be found in the concept of the creative application of Marxism-Leninism.¹⁵ It was said that "the XXth Party Congress, drawing on Lenin's teachings and the experience of international relations . . ." expounded peaceful coexistence.¹⁶ In short, Khrushchev creatively applied Marxism-Leninism to the existing conditions of international relations and in so doing determined that peaceful coexistence should become a strategy. It is over the application of Marxism-Leninism to the present conditions of international relations that the Chinese Communists disagreed. They asserted that Khrushchev did not creatively apply Marxism-Leninism but rather he revised it.¹⁷

What are the conditions of peaceful coexistence? These were cited at both the XXth Party Congress of the CPSU and at the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution in 1957 (at which time the Moscow Declaration of 1957 was proclaimed):

. . . in essence the repudiation of war as a means of solving controversial issues. It presupposes an obligation to refrain from every form of violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of another state. It implies renunciation of interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It means that political and economic relations must be put on a basis of complete equality and mutual benefit.¹⁸

These conditions of peaceful coexistence are composed of the same components as the five principles found in the 1954 Sino-Indian treaty. It is important to note that the five principles were enunciated as the basis for relations between the "socialist camp" and Asia and Africa (the *tiers monde* or third world). At the XXth Party Congress they were asserted as the basis of relations for a historical epoch between the two camps—socialist and capitalist, East and West. Thus were the principles of peaceful coexistence broadened.

Why did the leadership of the CPSU opt for a policy of peaceful coexistence? In 1959 Khrushchev wrote of the growing concern over the implications of technology: "In our age of the H-bomb and atomic techniques, this is the main thing of interest to every man."¹⁹ As Shepilov, member of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, noted in the spring of 1957, "The atomic bombs are a threat to the *whole of mankind*."²⁰ (Emphasis added.) The "whole of mankind" includes socialism as well as capitalism. The Soviet leadership realized that a nuclear or general war would end in the destruction of both camps. This awesome fact had far-reaching implications on both Soviet strategy and tactics.

Technology not only made wars more destructive but also made the world smaller. As Khrushchev wrote in October 1959:

We, all of us, well know that tremendous changes have taken place in the world. Gone indeed are the days when it took weeks to cross the ocean from one continent to the other or when a trip from Europe to America, or from Asia to Africa, seemed a very complicated undertaking. The progress of modern technology has reduced our planet to a rather small place; it has become, in this sense, quite congested. And if in our daily life it is a matter of considerable importance to establish normal relations with our neighbors in a densely inhabited settlement, this is so much the more necessary in the relations between states, in particular states belonging to different social systems.²¹

The "normal relations" which Khrushchev envisaged were based on peaceful coexistence.

Although peaceful coexistence has a special meaning to the Soviets (as will become evident when the corollary to peaceful coexistence, the concept of peaceful competition, is examined), it is of course a sign of good judgment that the leadership of the U.S.S.R. recognizes the mutual suicidal character of a general war. Peaceful coexistence represents the stated intentions of the Soviet Union to contain the intercamp conflict.

First Corollary of Peaceful Coexistence: War Is Not Inevitable

Khrushchev proclaimed at the XXth Party Congress that "war is not fatalistically inevitable."²² In the official *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, the following reason is given for the nonapplicability of Lenin's thesis of the inevitability of war:

The 20th Party Congress of the CPSU drew the conclusion that there was a real possibility of averting wars of aggression in the present day international conditions. Lenin formulated his thesis about the inevitability of such wars in the epoch of imperialism, at a time when, first, capitalism was the only, and all-embracing world system, and secondly, when the social and political forces that had no interest in, and were opposed to, war were weak, poorly organized and hence unable to compel the imperialists to renounce war.²³

Conditions had changed. The balance of world forces had shifted more favorably toward the socialist camp. A modification of Lenin's thesis was now in order. As Khrushchev told the XXth Party Congress:

There is, of course, a Marxist-Leninist precept that wars are inevitable as long as imperialism exists. In that period [before the Second World War and earlier] this precept was absolutely correct. At the present time, however, the situation has changed radically. Now there is a world camp of socialism which has become a mighty force. . . . Moreover, there is a large group of other countries with a population running into many hundreds of millions [the uncommitted third world], which are actively working to avert war. . . . As long as capitalism survives in the world, the reactionary forces representing the interests of the capitalist monopolies will continue their drive toward military gambles and aggression and may try to unleash war. But war is not fatalistically inevitable.²⁴

Two factors caused the shifting balance of world forces that led Khrushchev to assert the noninevitability of war. First, there was the growing might of the socialist camp under the leadership of the Soviet Union. Second, there was the evolution of a "zone of peace,"²⁵ the uncommitted nations of the third world. These factors represented a considerable restraining

factor, as the Soviets saw it, upon the imperialists and made it possible to avert general war.

Ideologically, militarily, and economically the might of the Soviet Union was expanding in Soviet eyes. By the time of the XXIst Party Congress (1959) Khrushchev boasted, "Capitalist encirclement of our country no longer exists."²⁶ In fact, said Khrushchev, socialism would begin to encircle the encirclers.

Khrushchev frequently asserted the ideological strength of the Soviet Union and the "socialist camp." To Tomoo Hirooka, a Japanese news correspondent, he said on June 18, 1957 (as he had many times before): "All the world will come to communism."²⁷ On April 9, 1958, to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Khrushchev proclaimed: "Capitalism is at its ebb, heading for collapse."²⁸

Militarily the U.S.S.R. was also strong. In this belief Khrushchev told the Kalinin constituency of Moscow on February 24, 1959: "Under present conditions, the use of threats and ultimatums, especially in relation to the Soviet Union, is obviously an unsuitable method, for it is not in accord with the real correlation of forces."²⁹ In Kiev on May 11 he said: "But our country is big, it is difficult to defeat in war."³⁰ Or again, in Leipzig, East Germany, in March: "We possess everything to restrain any aggressor."³¹

Economically, too, the Soviet Union was characterized as "on the move." To the VIIth Communist Party Congress of Bulgaria, Khrushchev asserted on June 4, 1958: "We are firmly convinced that the time is approaching when socialist countries will outstrip the most developed capitalist countries not only in tempo but also in volume of industrial production."³² In Hungary on April 7, 1958, Khrushchev, then First Secretary of the CPSU, spoke of the West's attempts to catch up with the U.S.S.R.: "Who now intends to catch up with the Soviet Union in scientific development? The United States of America is now setting for itself the task of catching up with the Soviet Union."³³

Coupled with the growth in power of the Soviet Union and the "socialist camp," Khrush-

chev saw the emergence of a "zone of peace" as contributing to the shifting balance of world forces in favor of the socialist world. He reported this development to the XXth Party Congress:

Comrades, between XIXth and the XXth Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union very important changes have taken place in international relations. . . . The forces of peace have been considerably augmented by the emergence in the world arena of a group of peace-loving European and Asian states which have proclaimed non-participation in blocs as the principle of their foreign policy. . . . As a result, a vast zone of peace, including peace loving states, both socialist and non-socialist, of Europe and Asia, has emerged in the world.³⁴

With recognition of the emergence of a vast "zone of peace" (a zone of developing nations aligned with the "socialist camp" against war), Soviet foreign policy became increasingly directed toward closer relations with the developing third world countries in an attempt to seek a common understanding with them against the West.

Because of the shifting balance of world forces and the growth of world technology, there existed no third choice, as Khrushchev saw it, in foreign policy for any state: either it was peaceful coexistence or it was war. In Khrushchev's words to the XXth Congress: "Indeed, there are only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most decisive destructive war in history."³⁵ In 1960 Major General Nikolai Talenskii, Chief Editor of *Military Thought*, journal of the Soviet military staff, stated: "War as an instrument of policy is becoming outdated [because] the process of development of techniques in the destruction of peoples makes it impossible now to use weapons for the solution of political tasks, as has been the case in the course of thousands of years."³⁶

This statement does not mean, of course, that the Soviet Union would forego the use of these weapons for self-defense. Nor does it mean the renunciation of the use of all force and violence. Only use of nuclear force in a general

war was General Talenskii's concern. The U.S.S.R. continues to support "just wars of national liberation." As the XXth Party program reads: "It is their duty to support the sacred struggle of the oppressed peoples and their just anti-imperialist wars of liberation."³⁷ This reservation leaves a wide range of military activities open. Participation, directly or indirectly, in wars of national liberation (tempered with caution and concern about escalation of such limited wars to the level of general nuclear conflict) becomes possible.

Khrushchev gave attention to the problem of escalation, clearly qualifying Soviet involvement in the nonsocialist world by announcing that "socialism does not intend to overthrow capitalism in other countries by means of 'exporting' revolutions."³⁸ On the contrary, revolutions to be successful from the Soviet viewpoint must be indigenous. However, nonindigenous Communists might assist in bringing a revolution to fruition. Once a war of national liberation was under way, it was the duty of all Communists to support it. In this way the Soviet Union remains outside the conflict and consequently removed from actual military involvement while assisting nonetheless the "progressive forces" of the liberation movement. Becoming involved in this manner has as its purpose the prevention of escalation of "just wars of national liberation" into nuclear holocaust.

Peaceful coexistence is a struggle that differs from war not in objectives sought but in the means used. In the words of the late Marshal Boris M. Shaposhnikov of the Red Army, "If war is a continuation of politics only by other means, so also peace is a continuation of conflict by other means." Peace is the absence of general nuclear war and nothing more. Khrushchev described to his comrades what peaceful coexistence will do:

Peaceful coexistence affords favorable opportunities for the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries and facilitates the struggle of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries for their liberation.³⁹

"Friendship," said the First Secretary, "is true and strong if people share the same views on events, history and life."⁴⁰ Peaceful coexistence is not friendship. "We are guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism, friendship and brotherly co-operation between peoples in mutual relations between socialist states." But, Khrushchev added, "When we talk about coexistence we have in mind socialist and capitalist states. Those forces opposed to each other: antagonistic conditions exist between them."⁴¹ It is noteworthy that no third conceptualization seems to exist for neutrals.

What is peaceful coexistence, then, if not friendship? At Prague in 1957, Khrushchev explained: "Indeed it happens that people do not get married for love, but despite that they live their whole lives together. And that is what we want. We live on one planet and therefore we want peaceful competition."⁴² Socialism has no love for capitalism but wishes to have peaceful competition. Peaceful coexistence provides the conditions necessary for peaceful competition.

Second Corollary of Peaceful Coexistence: Peaceful Competition and Its Implications

What does peaceful competition entail? "For over forty years," Khrushchev told a Soviet-Czechoslovakian Friendship Meeting, July 12, 1958, "a socialist and capitalist system have existed. Of course, irreconcilable political and ideological contradictions existed and will exist between these two systems, and there was and still will continue to be a *certain struggle* between them."⁴³ (Emphasis added.) That certain struggle is represented today by the concept of peaceful competition, a corollary to peaceful coexistence.

Peaceful competition makes peaceful coexistence a dynamic, rather than a static, relationship. Conditions between the socialist and capitalist camps are not frozen. On the contrary, as Khrushchev indicated in 1957: "But in peaceful

competition we will work to win out. Here if I may say so, the Soviet people will be on the offensive."⁴⁴ Peaceful coexistence becomes a form of intense ideological, economic, political, and cultural struggle between the "proletariat and the aggressive forces of imperialism."

On the ideological front, Khrushchev has frequently referred to "peaceful coexistence in the field of ideology as treason."⁴⁵ In 1955 he told the East German Communist leaders:

People say our smiles are not honest. That is not true. Our smiles are real and not artificial. But if anyone believes that our smile means that we have given up the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, they are badly mistaken.⁴⁶

Later in the year he asserted, "If certain people regard as a violation of the 'Geneva spirit' our conviction that victory will be on the side of socialism, of Marxism-Leninism, these people obviously do not understand the 'Geneva spirit' correctly. They should remember that we have never renounced our ideas, the struggle for victory of communism."⁴⁷ In the 1960 Moscow Declaration we find:

Peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social systems does not mean conciliation of socialist and bourgeois ideology. On the contrary, it implies intensification of the struggle of the working class of all the Communist Parties, for the triumph of socialist ideas.⁴⁸

In his report to the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1963, Khrushchev said: "Hatred of class enemies is necessary, because it is not possible to become a good fighter for your people or for Communism if one does not know how to hate enemies. Yes, comrades, a harsh class struggle is now in progress throughout the world."⁴⁹

Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., of Harvard University, reasoned that an absence of coexistence in the field of ideology would mean that there could not be coexistence at all. "The world would break up into self-contained parts, each sealed off from the rest by high walls against ideas."⁵⁰ The leadership of the CPSU did not agree; peaceful coexistence and continuation

of the ideological struggle were compatible.

The economic front is, as Khrushchev explained at the XXIst Party Congress, January 27, 1959, "the main field in which the peaceful competition of socialism and capitalism is taking place. . . ."⁵¹ The Soviet challenge: "Let us prove to each other the advantages of one's own system not with fists, not by war, but by peaceful economic competition in conditions of peaceful coexistence."⁵²

For this reason the Soviets labor to develop the resources of their own country. Khrushchev, speaking on the new Seven Year Plan in 1958, said: "The realization of the Seven Year Plan of the development of the national economy for 1959-1965 will be another important stage in peaceful economic competition of the two systems—socialism and capitalism."⁵³ Strengthening of the domestic economy is intended to give the Soviets "a decisive advantage in the international alignment of forces."⁵⁴ The purpose of the plan is to affect favorably the balance of world forces and make it all the more likely that general nuclear war can be avoided.

Moreover, it provides the Soviet Union with an economic base from which they can exert themselves internationally. The leaders of the CPSU have long recognized a close relationship between economics and politics, arising out of Communist ideology. It was not surprising, therefore, that shortly after Stalin's death the Soviet Union began to engage in international economic competition through trade and aid. Commentators in the West called it an "economic offensive."⁵⁵ In 1955, for example, Khrushchev told a group of United States Congressmen visiting the U.S.S.R. that "we value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes." Two years later the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikita S. Khrushchev, proclaimed: "We declare war upon you—excuse me for using such an expression—in the peaceful field of trade. We declare war. We will win over the United States. The threat of the United States is not

the ICBM, but in the field of peaceful production."⁵⁶ A "war called peace" is what is meant by coexistence.

On the political front, Khrushchev discussed before the XXth Party Congress the technique of winning control in a country through parliamentary majority:

The winning of a stable parliamentary majority backed by a mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat and of all the working people could create for the working class in a number of capitalist and former colonial countries the conditions needed to secure fundamental social changes.

In the countries where capitalism is still strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal, the reactionary forces will of course inevitably offer serious resistance. There the transition to socialism will be attended by sharp class, revolutionary struggle.

But he added, "It is not true that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake society."⁵⁷

Anastas I. Mikoyan, member of the Presidium and Central Committee of the CPSU, offered the assembled Congress the following example: "Because of the favorable postwar situation in Czechoslovakia the socialist revolution was carried out by peaceful means."⁵⁸ Another delegate, I. G. Kebin, cited the Baltic states, in their transition to socialism, as having been "peacefully" occupied and then annexed to the U.S.S.R.⁵⁹

In other words, the Soviets are willing to use parliamentary means to achieve their objectives domestically within a country or to use diplomacy on the international plane. But the choice of whether peaceful political means are employed or not depends upon the particular circumstances involved.

On the cultural front: "The USSR proposes to the capitalist states that we should compete . . . not by expanding the Cold War but by exchanging our cultural values."⁶⁰ And peaceful coexistence aims at "creating conditions in which there may be normal . . . cultural and

scientific relations [as well as] mutual exchange of tourists. . . ." ⁶¹

The Soviet *weltanschauung* may be stated briefly: (1) the world is divided into two eternally antagonistic systems that are bound to try to dominate one another; (2) Communism will prevail in the end; and (3) in this struggle all methods are permissible except those that involve a risk of general nuclear war. Resting on these three pillars of belief is the lintel of peaceful coexistence.

IN THE AUTHOR'S OPINION, peaceful coexistence has been, in the past, the inversion of General von Clausewitz's famous dictum, "War is the continuation of politics by other means." Peaceful coexistence has been merely a period of struggle waged by nonnuclear means. Up to this point, the Soviet strategy has appeared to be a transmutation of the golden rule: "Prevent others from doing unto you what you want to do unto them." Peaceful coexistence has meant that the West was expected to remain passive while the "socialist camp" attempted to gain the upper hand (or to use Khrushchev's words, "to bury us"). In 1959 Khrushchev called for an "end of the Cold War," by which he probably meant, stop resisting. Perhaps coexistence was originally devised as surrender on the installment plan.

In short, heretofore peaceful coexistence has proven to be neither peaceful nor coexistence. Apparently, an estrangement in vocabularies existed between West and East. "Peaceful coexistence" could have been ranked with those terms which lend themselves to being exploited for their strong positive connotation as universal values but which yet do not seem to motivate sufficiently meaningful discussion of the concepts they represent. However, American foreign policy is and must be governed by the future prospect of true peace and coexistence, not by the misunderstandings, fears, and legacies of the past.

Notes

1. Russell H. Fifield, "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 52 (July 1958), p. 505.
2. Nikita S. Khrushchev as quoted in *Soviet World Outlook*, Department of State Publication no. 6836, July 1959, p. 182. (Hereafter cited as *Soviet World Outlook*.)
3. Wladyslaw W. Kulski, *Peaceful Coexistence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959), p. 137.
4. See V. Durdenevskii, "Five Principles," *International Affairs* (Moscow), vol. 3 (March 1958), p. 45.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Pravda*, February 17, 1957, as quoted in Kulski, p. 69.
7. Kulski, p. 81.
8. P. 3.
9. Kulski, pp. 69-70.
10. Nikita S. Khrushchev, "Speech to the XXth Party Congress" as quoted in G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 42. (Hereafter cited as "Hudson, Lowenthal, MacFarquhar.")
11. "Long Live Leninism," editorial, *People's Daily*, April 22, 1960, as reprinted in Hudson, Lowenthal, MacFarquhar, p. 98.
12. Nikita S. Khrushchev to the Jubilee Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, November 6, 1957, *New Times*, no. 46 (November 14, 1957), supplement, p. 6.
13. *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, [1964]), p. 679. (Hereafter cited as *History of the Communist Party*.)
14. Nikita S. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 38 (October 1959), p. 79. (Hereafter cited as "On Peaceful Coexistence.")
15. Terms defined: **Revisionism** destroys Marxism-Leninism by declaring "that it is 'outmoded' and alleges that it has lost its significance for social progress." **Dogmatism** destroys Marxism-Leninism by "replacing the study of concrete situations with merely quoting classics and sticking to books, and leads to the isolation of the Party from the masses." **Creative Marxism** revitalizes Marxism-Leninism through its "creative application" to "changing conditions."—Moscow Declaration of 1957 as reprinted in Hudson, Lowenthal, MacFarquhar, pp. 52-53.
16. *Pravda*, March 12, 1958, as quoted in *Soviet World Outlook*, p. 98.
17. This applies not only to peaceful coexistence but to the Soviet leadership's view of the inevitability of war, peaceful transition to socialism, and the like.
18. Khrushchev as quoted in *Soviet World Outlook*, p. 98.
19. "On Peaceful Coexistence," p. 79.
20. *Pravda*, February 13, 1957.
21. "On Peaceful Coexistence," p. 78.
22. Hudson, Lowenthal, MacFarquhar, p. 44.
23. *History of the Communist Party*, pp. 644-45.
24. *Pravda*, February 15, 1956, as quoted in Kulski, p. 97.
25. At times a third factor is included, namely, the acceptability of a peace policy by the masses.
26. *Khrushchev and the Shifting Balance of World Forces*, Legislative Reference Service, Senate Document 86, September 1959, p. 4.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Pravda*, February 15, 1956, as quoted in Kulski, p. 124.
35. Hudson, Lowenthal, MacFarquhar, p. 43.
36. *New York Times*, October 13, 1960.
37. As quoted in Philip E. Mosely, "The Meaning of Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 41 (October 1962), p. 40.
38. "On Peaceful Coexistence," p. 80.
39. Mosely, p. 42.
40. Khrushchev, *Pravda*, March 27, 1958, as quoted in Kulski, p. xxi.
41. *Pravda*, June 30, 1957, as quoted in Kulski, p. 134.
42. "Speech at Prague Castle," Radio Prague, July 12, 1957, *Soviet World Outlook*, p. 98.
43. *Soviet World Outlook*, p. 97.
44. Interview with William Randolph Hearst, Jr., November 22, 1957, *Pravda*, November 29, 1957, as quoted in *Soviet World Outlook*, p. 98.
45. As quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Coexistence v. Peace," *Survey*, no. 50 (January 1964), p. 14.
46. As quoted in Dean Acheson, *Power and Diplomacy* (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 10-11.
47. Khrushchev, "Speech about Trip to India, Burma and Afghanistan," *Pravda*, December 30, 1955, as quoted in *Soviet World Outlook*, p. 188.
48. As quoted in Sir William Hayter, "The Meaning of Coexistence," *Survey*, no. 50 (January 1964), p. 24.
49. Schlesinger, p. 23.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
51. *Soviet World Outlook*, p. 99.
52. "On Peaceful Coexistence," p. 86.
53. *Soviet World Outlook*, p. 99.
54. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," reciting the "control figures for the economic development of the USSR," report delivered at the XXIst Party Congress, p. 43.
55. There are several reasons why the Soviet Union did not engage in such actions earlier, not least of which was Stalin himself. See Robert Loring Allen, *Soviet Economic Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960).
56. Interview with William Randolph Hearst, Jr., November 22, 1957, in *Washington Post and Times Herald*, November 24, 1957. This remark was omitted from the Soviet text published in *Pravda*.
57. As quoted in Leo Gruliov, *Current Soviet Policies*, II (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 38.
58. *Pravda*, February 19, 1956, as quoted in Kulski, p. 29.
59. *Pravda*, February 19, 1956, as quoted in Kulski, p. 29.
60. Khrushchev, "Speech at the Budapest Opera House," Budapest radio broadcast, April 3, 1958, as quoted in *Soviet World Outlook*, p. 99.
61. Khrushchev, "Speech at the Celebration by Builders of Lenin Central Moscow Stadium," *Pravda*, August 1, 1956, as quoted in *Soviet World Outlook*, p. 185.



THE RETURN OF *SHOO-SHOO BABY*

WILLIAM G. HOLDEN

5-14






The original crew of Shoo-Shoo Baby poses beside the late-model B-17G of the Eighth Air Force.

A VAST majority of the B-17s met a rather inglorious end following World War II. Most either faced the scrapper's torch or ended up as aluminum ingots. Almost all these combat-weary Flying Fortresses met their demise across the waters; very few made their way back to the States. This fact is sorely realized today, what with the burgeoning of aircraft museums around the world. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, there are only three Forts left in existence that actually saw combat. These are the *Swoose*, which is awaiting the day it will be displayed at the Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum. Then there is the *Memphis Belle*, displayed in Memphis, Tennessee. The third Fort, which like the *Memphis Belle* served with the 91st Bomb Group, has just returned to the States, eventually to be restored and displayed in the magnificent new Air Force Museum. Yes, after almost thirty years, the *Shoo-Shoo Baby* has come home.

The *Baby* was (or should we say "is"?) a late-model B-17G, serial number 42-32076, that was assigned to the 401st Bomb Squadron of the 91st Bomb Group. Lieutenant Paul G. McDuffee was assigned as her original pilot. The favorite song of Crew Chief Hank Cordes was "Shoo-Shoo Baby"; hence it was inevitable that the song title would adorn the nose of the then-new Fort, along with a rather scantily clad young lady.

In all the long list of 340 missions made by the 91st, surely the strangest entry of all was this notation: "9-4-44, Gdynia—recalled" and immediately below, on the same date, was "1 A/C Marienburg,

At this stage of her career, Baby boasted three "Shoos" and a modestly posed pinup. . . . "A" markings designate Fortresses of Baby's 91st Bomb Group, massing for takeoff (opposite). . . . Three from the 91st head for the target of the day.



Completed." Though in the early days the group sometimes had to struggle to get more than half a dozen planes in the air, this was certainly the only case in Eighth Air Force history for which a group got mission credit with only one aircraft participating.

And it all started out as a perfectly normal morning for pilot Paul McDuffee and the crew of the *Shoo-Shoo Baby*. At briefing, the weight was hanging way up on the wall, so everyone knew at once it would be a long, mean one. Gdynia, a Polish rail and shipping center, was the target. The group was to assemble at altitude over East Anglia and proceed from there.

As usual, the weather was miserable, with fog, zero visibility, and a heavy overcast. The crews went through the "set and sweat" period, waiting for a mission scrub that never came. Instead, the planes took off, only to be swallowed up immediately in the overcast.

Shoo-Shoo Baby cut through a thin layer of overcast into clear air at several thousand feet, without another plane in sight, and then plunged into a layer above that seemed endless. McDuffee and the crew kept looking and climbing higher and higher, reaching for the top, scared stiff at the thought of several dozen other Forts struggling just as blindly through

the mess and likely to make contact at any moment.

At 30,600 feet the plane broke clear, almost in the middle of a group of B-24s. "We were within wing tip distance of the last plane in the formation," McDuffee recalled, "and the slipstream bounces nearly tore the wings off. We were all petrified!"

Except for the 24s, there was not a plane in sight. They flew in circles for some minutes, looking in vain for other 91st planes. Checks indicated that *Baby's* radio was working, and no message of any change in plans or a recall had been received.


Finally, far off in the distance appeared a group of B-17s, and *Shoo-Shoo Baby* headed for an intercept. When she closed up, however, the crew could see it was not the 91st but another First Division group. At the moment, McDuffee was not choosy and decided to tuck in where he could and ride with the herd. The only open spot was deputy lead, so *Shoo-Shoo Baby* slid in there, despite protestations and general shaking of fists by the other pilots in the formation. With radio silence ordered, that was about all they could do.

"We'd found a home," McDuffee declared, "and we weren't about to be dispossessed!"





Hardly recognizable even as a B-17 (the result of various postwar modifications for civilian use in Sweden, Denmark, and France as well as subsequent nose damage), *Shoo-Shoo Baby* was given to the U.S. Air Force by France. Recovery began by dismantling her to go home.



The group was apparently going to a target other than the one assigned to the 91st, for the heading was approximately 40 degrees, which carried them up near the tip of Sweden before they swung right on a 145-degree heading.

“When we approached the coast the navigator immediately picked up Gdynia and Danzig, which obviously were not the targets, and we changed to a course of 190 degrees. About that time we hit a terrific flak barrage and hundreds of fighters,” McDuffee remembered. “We opened the bomb-bay doors and headed for the target when the others did, though we really didn’t know what it was. After turning off the target run, we noticed that six B-17s had been lost.”

On the way to the coast, *Shoo-Shoo Baby* encountered a mystery that no one to this day has been able to explain. “A shell burst ahead and above us, emitting what appeared to be a big puff of brown smoke. Immediately, another burst just above us, and the whole plane was covered with what looked to be brown tobacco juice. The windows and windshields were completely covered, and the wipers only made it worse. The only way we could see to fly for the rest of the trip was to slide back the windows a bit and sort of stick one eye out.”

About halfway across the North Sea coming back, *Shoo-Shoo Baby* left her unknown friends and set course for Bassingbourn. The plane landed safely after 12 hours and 55 minutes in the air, and all four engines quit simultaneously on the taxi strip—all the fuel was gone.

In talking to the tower, McDuffee asked how many others had gotten back OK. “Nobody,” said the tower man, and then before shock

could totally overwhelm the crew, "Nobody else went. We had a recall."

"Waiting for us to come in was Colonel Claude Putnam and some major general," McDuffee recalled. "We were sure that our names were mud! When I stepped out of the plane after all those hours of flying, I fell to my knees; and when Colonel Putnam came up, I asked him not to be too hard on us, since I was already on my knees."

"He just laughed and said that we'd been to Marienburg, that our flight reflected honor on the 91st, that the general was pleased and had said the 91st would get group credit for our [lone] mission."

Why didn't *Shoo-Shoo Baby* get the recall? A freak accident had disabled the radio so that it appeared to function normally but did not receive. So the crew never got the recall.

The "tobacco juice"? They never did discover what it was. All his buddies claim that McDuffee flew through a blivet for sure, but, as he says, "Who ever saw a blivet flying at 30,000 feet?"

McDuffee flew his 30th mission in the *Baby* on the 24th of May 1944, having flown several missions with Lieutenant Robert J. Guenther as his copilot, preparatory to Guenther's taking over the aircraft commander post.

Then commander duties were handed over to Bob Guenther, who would be *Baby's* second and final military boss. It was then, supposedly, that the nose got the additional "Shoo" that appears in the only known wartime picture of the plane. But there appears to be some uncertainty about this.

After several missions with Guenther at the helm, the *Baby* was faced with an extremely tough one: a mission to Poznań, Poland, that approached the capacity of the B-17. The mission length was approximately 1450 miles. The flight is well remembered by one of the crew members, J. M. Lowdermilk:

"The navigator always got to the plane late, as the rest of the crew was ready to go, and I remember that as I walked up to the plane Bob

[Guenther] asked me if I knew the way to Sweden because we might run out of gas. I stated that I did and that I had the course charted. This was all in jest, but I have often wondered what would have happened had this been overheard by the ground crew, since actually we did go to Sweden.

"We had trouble on take-off with a full gas and bomb load. The supercharger on number three engine overheated but after take-off was operational. We rendezvoused with many other B-17s over the English Channel, and the plotted course was toward Berlin, then doglegged around Berlin, to Poznań, where the bombs were to be dropped, north to the Baltic Sea, out across Denmark, and finally back down the English Channel to home.

"Soon after we crossed the German border, we lost number three engine, I believe because of losing oil pressure. Bob could not get the prop feathered. It continued to windmill the entire trip with no vibration. We attempted to stay in formation with three engines but found this impossible and had to drop out. We continued on course to the best of my ability. We were losing altitude but continued to the target and dropped our bombs. Flying alone toward the Baltic Sea, we saw many German fighters attacking formations of B-17s and could not understand why they didn't pick us out as a straggler. Before we reached the Baltic Sea, we lost the second engine, and the decision had to be made to go to Sweden because we could not make it back to England. Bob asked for a course to Sweden, and I charted one to a little town called Ystad in the very southernmost part of Sweden.

"All loose equipment, including machine guns, radio equipment, and clothing, was thrown overboard in order to lighten the ship. An attempt was made to drop the ball turret, but it wouldn't move.

"As we approached the coastline, Bob was interested in knowing whether or not it was Sweden. I confidently stated that it was, but after the flak started coming up as we got over

land, I wasn't so sure. All of it was low, and I believe the Swedes were just telling us 'Don't try anything.' Just before we reached land we lost the third engine, and we were losing altitude fast. A Swedish fighter came up and led us to Malmö, Sweden, where a B-24, also in trouble, landed just ahead of us. Actually, we had to swing wide to keep from colliding.

"At this point I blew my chance to be a hero. The B-17 carried a navigational aid called a Geebox. This instrument had a red button that was to be pushed in case of emergency, to prevent certain information from falling into the hands of the enemy. I was so glad to get down on the ground and out of the plane that I failed to push the button.

"We were removed from the plane by Swedish soldiers with rifles and machine guns. Most of us were wearing heated flight suits over long underwear, and we were a sorry-looking sight coming off the plane."

The pilot, Bob Guenther, now a resident of Scottsdale, Arizona, explains: "None of us except the engineer ever saw *Shoo-Shoo Baby* again. The engineer went along with the Swedes to help them take her to the internment area.

"We were taken into a building, where we submitted name, rank, and serial number. We were told that the American authorities would be informed of our presence. Within the next few days, we were transported to a resort camp called Lokabrun near Ludvika. Treatment there was good. We had two men to the room and maid service. There was a detachment of Swedish soldiers in the camp, but things were very informal. We soon bought civilian clothes and bicycles, and each week we were allowed a 24-hour pass from camp and a 3-day pass each month. We went to Stockholm a number of times, were arrested there for taking pictures of the naval harbor, and generally had a good time.

"During late October, 1944, we were taken to Stockholm, and on October 29 a white B-24 with a civilian crew took us out at night under

cloud cover across Norway and into northern Scotland. I was loaded into the bomb bay with what seemed like 30 other men. We returned to our base in England and then back to the States."


FOLLOWING THE WAR, the *Baby* was officially given to Sweden by the United States. She was modified into a transport by SAAB, served with the Danish Air Lines, and then with the Royal Danish Air Force. In 1954 the plane was sold to the Babb Company and then to the Institute Géographique National in France for work as a survey aircraft. Her last mission in performing that function was in 1961. She has not flown since.

Steve Birdsall, the Australian air historian, traced her through years of hard tracking. He found her engineless and parked on the ramp at Creil, France, in a somewhat battered condition. He brought his find to the attention of the 91st Bomb Group Memorial Association and initiated efforts to save *Shoo-Shoo Baby* from the scrap heap. As Birdsall pointed out, "This veteran was the last combat B-17 to survive, and she deserves a better fate."



When found, the *Baby* had undergone a number of rather extensive modifications to perform the many jobs she had done since the fateful Poland raid. All the original equipment had been stripped out, and seats had been installed. The waist-gun positions had been closed up and windows with curtains put in. The complete nose section had been removed and a considerably longer nose installed. A military-type nose will be installed when the aircraft is restored. There were also some "windows" installed in the floor for the geographic missions she performed. The tail turret was completely "metaled" over. Her sides carried the SAAB commercial markings.


French officials, as a gesture of friendship between the United States and France, presented the B-17 to Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans, Jr., for preservation by the

Airlifted from Rhein-Main AB, Germany, to Wright-Patterson AFB by C-5A, Baby is home at last.



The dismembered pieces will require many hours of skilled work over the next several years before the Air Force Museum can display a freshly renovated Shoo-Shoo Baby.





Air Force Museum. The journey from France to the Air Force Museum required the assistance of the United States Air Forces in Europe to disassemble and crate the plane for truck shipment to Germany and eventual airlift to the United States. From Rhein-Main Air Base in Germany the *Baby* was flown directly to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, home of the Air Force Museum. *Baby* traveled in style, in the belly of a giant C-5A transport.

On hand at Wright-Pat were several of *Shoo-Shoo Baby's* old friends. Wartime pilot Paul McDuffee, now a Tampa, Florida, insurance man, and retired Major General Stanley T. Wray, once 91st Bomb Group Commander, were waiting among the reception committee.

"It's been twenty-eight years," said McDuffee as he watched the disassembled bomber being unloaded. "I've just got to go over and kiss her." And he did it!

The Air Force Museum, over the next two or three years, plans to get the *Baby* back as near

as possible to her fighting trim. Then she will probably replace the Museum's present B-17, which did not see combat.

The 91st Bomb Group Memorial Association is quite excited about the acquisition and plans to hold one of its upcoming reunions at Dayton so the members will be able to see her. The organization boasts some 1700 veterans of the group, commonly known as "Wray's Ragged Irregulars."

As one 91st veteran put it, "When we flew in the likes of her, we were nothing but a bunch of pimply-faced kids. But she now sure brings back a lot of memories to a lot of old fifty-year-olds."

Welcome home, *Baby!*


Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Acknowledgment

Recent photographs are by Len Pytel, and all are by courtesy of the Air Force Museum.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, AND DISCOUNTING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MAJOR RICHARD ZOCK



HERE was a time, in the not-too-distant past, when the education of a young man with intentions of following a military career was heavily weighted toward the study of engineering, geopolitics, and military history. Economics was not considered to be a terribly relevant discipline to the military aspirant. Defense budgets were smaller in absolute terms; budget allocations were made on the basis of “need”; economic analysis was not considered to be a vital military function; and scholarly pursuit in the field of economics was generally recommended for the student who planned a university teaching profession. The economist was perceived to be a theoretician, not a practitioner.

In a sense, economists of prior generations tended to agree with the military educators. Although they perceived the study of economic theory to be relevant to the defense establishment, it was seen to be applicable only in the broadest sense. Macroeconomics, the study of economic aggregates, dealt with the problems of allocation of scarce resources among the public and the private sectors.

The results of analyses at these lofty, theoretical levels certainly impacted upon the military in the size of its budgets, but most felt this was not an appropriate function to be performed by the military itself.

Microeconomics, a more specialized discipline often called "the theory of the firm," was relegated to problems of profit maximization. Since the military sold no products, generated no revenues, was not part of a market system, and charged no prices that could cover its costs, profit maximization did not appear to be a consideration for the military planner. Consequently the tools of microeconomics languished in the private sector of the economy with little or no emphasis placed upon them in the not-for-profit arena.

It is clear that we have come a long way since the era I have briefly described. With the introduction of large forces in-being during peacetime, the heavy demands on the nation's resources by the military arm, and the dramatic growth in demand for the public dollar by "human resources" programs, it became more evident that the military is only one of many competitors for public funds. A new emphasis was placed upon the capability to measure, in some meaningful way, the extra contribution to society emanating from additional expenditure on defense. By the same token, periods of austerity produced a very relevant question: Does society lose more total benefit if a dollar is cut from Defense than it does when the dollar is taken from Health, Education and Welfare? For one even sketchily trained in the discipline of economics, these questions strongly imply such terms as "marginal cost," "marginal revenue," and "marginal product"—a few of the analytical measures that make microeconomic tools applicable to some macroeconomic problems.

The economist's skills, whether applied to efficiency in the large or in the small, are generally directed toward the *resource* allocation dilemma. Although we concern ourselves with *budgetary* limitations, the stark reality of scar-

city applies, of course, to the productive *resources* at our disposal; the monetary constraints simply denominate those land, labor, capital, and technology limits in terms of dollars—and rather "rubbery" dollars at that during periods of inflation.

With the increasing awareness of scarcity, it would seem that to our "fly and fight" motto we might want to add "efficiently." Given that we have defined a specific role, mission, or objective, our mandate is clearly to fulfill that role or achieve that objective at *minimum cost*. Similarly, given the public funds (resources) entrusted to us, we have a vital responsibility to maximize the military returns from those inputs. It is the economics discipline that stresses the resources to be combined in various ways to achieve those elusive optima.

Our current system in the Department of Defense *does* reflect this relatively new microeconomic approach to resource employment. The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) has imposed a requirement that the marginal costs of and marginal returns from various alternative resource mixes be assessed and that decision-making in Defense emphasize cost and contribution at the margin. This is not to say we have succeeded in neatly quantifying the equivalent of the private sector's "marginal cost = marginal revenue" equation. Clearly we have not. Nor are any claims made that the quantifications which have been made in any way represent what the numbers *should* be. We do not yet have the capability in the military to talk meaningfully in terms of normative economics; we are, however, interjecting some rational economic analysis into the decision-making process.

With respect to the level at which economic analysis is to be performed, it would appear that the concept is now being pushed as far down in the organizational framework as possible. Originally stressed by then Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, the emphasis is now being placed on decentralized analysis and decision-making, with the responsibility for

resource management being passed down to ever lower levels of command. One might expect that explicit guidance of some sort would naturally accompany a metamorphosis such as this. Some guidance does in fact exist. In February 1969, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) issued an instruction establishing the policy that an economic analysis would be performed in support of certain proposed investments in the Department of Defense.¹ The publication was steeped in terms familiar to those who had acquainted themselves with PPBS; unfortunately, however, it stresses a concept that may have applicability only under certain conditions. The instruction set out as its purposes and objectives to:

1. identify systematically the benefits and costs associated with resource requirements . . .;
2. highlight the key variables and the assumptions on which investment decisions are based and allow evaluation of these assumptions;
3. evaluate alternative methods of financing investments; and
4. compare the relative merits of various alternatives as an aid in selecting the best alternative.²

Clearly, these objectives are sound, rational, and highly worthy of pursuing. They represent an explicit statement of goals which, if attained, will lead to an efficient allocation of scarce resources among competing uses.

The DOD Instruction does not, however, address to any extent the dazzling array of analytical tools available to assist economic analysts in their pursuit of these objectives (nor do I mean to imply that it should). There is simply a listing of quantitative techniques, most of which are typically treated in depth in most statistics, economics, and management science courses.³ The instruction does, however, give particular emphasis to the tool of discounting and establishes rather specific guidelines for applying the method. The guidance includes

- a prescribed discount rate (10%);
- a table of discount factors (at 10%) which reflect an assumption that cost and/or savings flows will occur more or less continuously rather than in a “lumpy,” once-per-period fashion;

—a brief rationale for the use of discounting of future cash flows.

The justification for use of present value factors in DOD-proposed investments is stated as follows:

Interest will be treated as a cost which is related to all Government expenditures, regardless of whether there are revenues or income by way of special taxes for a project to be self-supporting. This position is based on the premise that no public investment should be undertaken without considering the alternative use of the funds which it absorbs or displaces.

1. One way for the DOD to assure this result is to adopt in public investment evaluations an interest rate policy which reflects the private sector investment opportunities foregone. The discount rate reflects the preference for current and future money sacrifices that the public exhibits in non-government transactions.⁴

The reader is encouraged to digest this reasoning carefully, for it is sound and eminently rational, *so long as all the conditions stated therein are met*. Whether those conditions are all in fact being met is, however, subject to question.

The thesis stated above is an opportunity cost concept, which justly contends that the cost of using resources in one employment must be denominated in terms of the return sacrificed in diverting those resources from their next-best employment. It says that the cost of using resources in the public sector is what they could have returned by being productively applied in the private sector. This is undeniably true, a valid concept, *if there are in fact productive alternative employments of those resources in the private sector*.

If, however, there is less than full employment of resources in the nongovernment sphere, what is the opportunity cost? If industry is operating at 75 percent of capacity and nearly 6 percent of the labor force is unemployed, would those resources have been employed at all had it not been for the public sector? What is the cost to the private sector of hiring a man who would otherwise have been

unemployed? Is there an opportunity cost to the nongovernment sector when the military purchases vehicles from a firm that employs capacity which otherwise would have been idle?

Consider the fiscal 1972 and proposed fiscal 1973 federal budgets. They have been, admittedly, clearly stimulative in nature. The federal budget, as a vehicle for fiscal policy, is the means by which incremental government spending is achieved. In accord with Keynesian economic theory, federal expenditures can and should be used to create supplemental demand, promote spending, and generate greater income, employment, and resource utilization. This additional government expenditure is as much directed toward stimulation of the national economy as it is toward providing specific public goods and services. If this is the case, can it be said that the opportunity cost of resources diverted from the private sector is of the same magnitude as it would be if all resources were fully employed? One could even ask whether there is an opportunity cost at all.

To counter this reasoning, one line of argument might be to point out that idle capacity and unemployed resources exist only in a spotty fashion throughout the economy. While steel industry resources may be underemployed, the construction industry is simultaneously pressed to the limits of its capacity. Consequently, in such an example, an opportunity cost is imposed on the private sector by government construction projects, but the cost is considerably less (or possibly nonexistent) with respect to government demand for steel. To the extent that this is true, it would be difficult to argue for a *uniform* discount rate to be applied to all government investments. By the same token, a position that *insisted* on the application of a standard rate for purposes of simplicity (a good reason incidentally) would have to face up to the fact that *in the aggregate* there are unused resources. Consequently, the credibility of the opportunity cost rationale would be weakened.

One might contend, then, that even though

all these disparate resource utilization rates do exist, the Treasury still faces a positive interest rate in its long, intermediate, and short term borrowings in the capital market. It could be asserted that this rate is, in part, indicative of the private sector's required rate of return for the forsaken use of funds. True enough, but that required rate of return for virtually riskless lending is *not* the basis put forth in support of discounting government investments. If that were the rationale, the composite rate would be simple enough to calculate and *would not be 10 percent*.

One crucial problem emerges from any discussion of an appropriate social rate of discount. It is the problem of defining that rate and determining its composition. Welfare economics offers some help in this matter by contending that there are actually *two* measures which require quantification. The first is the *marginal social rate of time preference*, which reflects society's rational bias in favor of consumption sooner rather than later. The second is a *risk adjusted marginal social rate of return from investment*, which reflects the returns that the private sector sacrifices when resources are diverted to public projects. To oversimplify, one measure mirrors society's preference for a dollar's worth of consumption now rather than tomorrow; the other reflects the opportunity cost of what that dollar could have returned by productive employment between today and tomorrow. There are elements of both in the theoretically appropriate social rate of discount, but they *need not necessarily be the same rate*. Only if they do in fact coincide is it possible to aspire to a theoretical maximum or optimum state of welfare in every segment of the economy.

The above may appear to be a tiresome digression into the ethereal and not-so-relevant world of theory, but it is in fact a vital point to be recognized when considering the concept of discounting. It explains why the U.S. Treasury does in fact face a positive (and possibly rising) interest rate in its borrowing activities, while

simultaneously there may be a relatively low opportunity cost to the private sector of diverting resources to public projects (such as defense).

The significant point here is that when resources are in excess supply relative to the demand for them (unemployment), the use of an arbitrary discount rate for public investments may well understate the benefits to be derived from those investments in future years while at the same time overstating the costs today. The DOD use of a 10 percent discount rate for proposed investment projects may well be responsible for an unjustified bias against defense expenditures for "out year" benefits because of some simple, mathematically correct but misguided computations.

The situation is, of course, worsened by the requirement that *future* rates of resource unemployment clearly should be predicted and incorporated in any analysis of long-lived public investment proposals. Unfortunately, this may not be an attractive computational device, since it would require government agencies to make explicit any expectations of future resource unemployment—a disclosure which most likely would not be politically palatable.

Does the foregoing discourse argue against discounting of proposed DOD investments? The answer is "Not necessarily." Discounting is still a defensible tool for internal analytical purposes (within DOD). Its use would be to assist in recognizing the *timing* of cost and benefit streams and as a decision-making aid in our arraying of alternatives in some priority fashion. There is no good rationale for giving equal weight to equal dollar outlays, which differ significantly in their timing, so long as a social rate of time preference exists. The discounting thesis, however, should *not* be justified solely on the grounds of the opportunity cost imposed on the private sector. That cost is clearly variable and one which may differ dramatically between one industry and another, in some cases approaching zero. The opportunity cost thesis does not represent a totally credible *single* rationale for discounting in DOD. Were discounting defended more as an internal allocative device, its use would be more believable, and a good case could be built for its reduction to something below the current 10 percent rate.

Air University Institute for Professional Development


Notes

1. Department of Defense Instruction 7041.3, "Economic Analysis of Proposed Department of Defense Investments," 26 February 1969.


2. *Ibid.*, 1, A.

3. As this article was being written, the Defense Economic Analysis Council issued its definitive *Economic Analysis Handbook*, which does treat in some detail each of the analytical techniques listed in DODI 7041.3.

4. DODI 7041.3, V. D.



JEROME G. PEPPERS, JR.



THE MILITARY LEADER
a manager of people



IN THE normal process of military organizations, the leader is never successful alone. He achieves success by effectively and efficiently marshaling the efforts of many people and focusing them on the unit's missions. Thus, the determinant of military leadership is the individual's ability to manage people. All other aspects of organizational functioning have little significance unless the people are effectively managed.

The style of leadership (management) adopted by a leader is tremendously influenced by his feelings about people. In turn, his adopted style exerts tremendous influence on the behavior of his people. Stated simply, if he feels that his people are responsible individuals, he will act accordingly in his direction of their efforts, and they will tend to act as they sense he expects them to act. If, on the other hand, he feels that people are "no damned good," they will sense it and respond in kind. In brief, it can be said that leadership is a relationship that exists between people, and that relationship is most certainly affected by the feelings of the people involved.

The same style of leadership or the same technique of influence will not be equally effective for all people or in all situations. Therefore, the effective leader will be the individual who acquires the ability to "read" the situation, know his people, and respond to both in a tailored manner. He recognizes that there is a difference between what his (the leader's) job should be and what the other person's job should be, and this recognition permits him to structure his own behavior as required by the situation *and* the people involved. In other words, the leader's style and applied technique must be sufficiently flexible to be appropriate to the particular group's needs and expectations.

Throughout history, military leaders have contributed immeasurably to management philosophy and managerial techniques. Their more recent contributions have been adapted and adopted worldwide in the areas of systems man-

agement, matrix organization, project management, personnel training, quantitative techniques, operations research, and inventory management, for a few examples. In return, of course, military leaders have borrowed concept and philosophy from their contemporaries in nonmilitary and nongovernment enterprises. The history of military organization reflects both give and take in management thought, and no military leader in today's Department of Defense should consider his job beyond help from outside sources: reported research, expository articles, or accounts of successful and unsuccessful leadership techniques.

An effective military leader may not be totally efficient. He may be gauged a success on the basis of results so long as only a casual measurement of cost is attempted. When cost measurement is also used to determine success, the leader must become conscious of cost-effectiveness and begin to evaluate his leadership/management actions from the point of view of both effectiveness and efficiency. In the military environment, effectiveness is the driving feature, as it must be for national survival. American military leaders have been and are now effective, as is evidenced by our continued existence as a society and source of world influence. Nevertheless, improved use of people should be a major personal goal of every military leader, and it is to that goal that the remainder of this article is addressed.

a basic philosophy—involvement

Doing a consistently good job of managing people is not accidental. It requires considerable effort, a real interest, the ability to understand people, a lot of time, and a willingness to share. Further, the leader must adopt an outlook that permits him to change because every interpersonal contact offers that possibility. Therefore, the leader must approach the people-management task with desire and dedication if he is to succeed with efficiency.

Successful management of people is an exercise in involvement. Detachment is not a step-

ping-stone to success even though it may sometimes be a worthwhile strategy. Most of the time, however, the leader must be sufficiently involved with his people so that he is consciously working to help them improve their ability to perform on the job. This demands his commitment to helping subordinates grow in competence, in ability to handle responsibility, and in capability to identify needs that must be satisfied for organizational success.

Involvement dictates that the leader learn to know his key subordinates as individuals, as persons. He cannot be involved with individuals, as he must be, if he permits himself to think of his subordinates only in terms of "group." Together, of course, the individuals form the group, and the group is the organizational element he leads and manages. But he will most likely acquire his greatest success and most satisfying job performance when he learns to know his people as individuals and works to relate their personal values, desires, and drives to organizational needs and group success.

Unless he does learn to know his people as individuals, he will probably adopt some philosophy that will lead him to thinking in terms of "average man." Such thinking masses people and forces them into molds that they do not fit and that eliminate any sense of individuality or personality. The techniques and notions that must accompany "average man" conceptualizations do not fit most of the people. Their use, then, increases the individual's sense of irritation and discomfort and makes him restive in the unit, restricting his capacity to contribute.

learning to know him

An effective leader is able to evaluate the situation in which he finds himself and determine how his people's individualities can best be used in that situation. Most do this automatically, seldom consciously thinking about what process is taking place. Obviously, knowing the individualities of the people means that much has gone before—much learning about the peo-

ple as distinctive persons with greatly different backgrounds. The people manager aspiring to a high probability of continuing effectiveness will make a concerted effort to know his people so that he can intelligently face any situation coming his way.

It should be clear that a leader's first concern for his people ought to be to know as well as possible those individuals who report directly to him. In many organizations this will leave a relatively large number of people with whom the leader will have infrequent personal contact. These people, of course, should be known by subordinate supervisory personnel under the same guide: those who report directly. Thus, this approach to leadership effectiveness is well within the capabilities of all responsible leaders and does not impose an unreasonable burden.

The first, and likely most obvious, learning medium is the personnel record system of the organization. These files offer quick and basic information about an individual's background, education, prior jobs, and experience. With this, the leader can approach each individual at an appropriate time for amplification through discussion, which can be most valuable in establishing rapport and displaying interest in the person as an individual. A few comments from the leader about the man's past (as gleaned from the records) will establish that the leader was, in fact, sufficiently interested to learn something about him prior to the conversation.

Private conversation with each individual offers the leader a good opportunity to learn how the other feels about his work, how he thinks, and how he responds to his environment. If these conversations are motivated by sincerity, the leader will recognize the effects of his involvement, as earlier outlined, and further recognize that he is establishing a foundation of mutuality from which can develop empathy and understanding. He will be addressing a need, existing in each of us, for assurance that the boss is indeed interested in making our contribution a meaningful and worthwhile use of abilities and skills.

These private conversations should be frequent and should never be considered as no longer necessary. The leader should arrange the opportunity for these conversations in such a way that they never give an impression they are held "because it's time for another chat." Rather, they should be maneuvered so that they seem to develop naturally and give the other person an assurance of true interest. An important element should be the leader's desire to listen to the other person. It is vital that the leader recognize how much difference true listening—not just hearing—will make in his learning about his personnel.

When this is recognized by the leader, he will be wise to somehow transfer to the other person how that person's words and actions are modifying the leader's actions, thinking, and understanding. Thus, the involvement process and its resulting changes in the people participants will be recognized and acknowledged. Often the other person will react in kind by revealing how the association is also changing him. When this begins to surface, the relationship will likely blossom with greater faith, trust, and performance.

A leader is often able to help a subordinate attain some personal goal if he knows that the goal exists. Therefore, some part of the learning-to-know-him process should include development of the opportunity for the participants to express their goals on this job and for this life. Thus, the leader learns some of the motivational factors of his people and is better able to help them, individually and collectively, realize their potentials. The leader, then, can encourage his people to seek new experiences and can contribute the support which only he can provide for personal improvement efforts.

the leader leads

A leader is expected to set the pace, provide a functional participation to the group, and contribute to the group in a manner that helps make goal attainment probable. Thus, if the

leader expects his people to work for goals, he must contribute to the establishment of those goals and to their attainment. The group will, unconsciously at least, expect to learn that the leader has some established personal goals, has exerted effort to define the group goals clearly, and encourages members of the group, individually, to set personal goals to which group membership will contribute.

Enthusiasm is a hallmark of leadership, and it is contagious. Problems are opportunities to the enthusiastic leader who gets a charge out of the challenge of risk that accompanies the opportunities. He is eager to work with new requirements because he is confident in his ability to meet the future even though he recognizes the probability of difficulties. In his enthusiasm he eagerly seeks help when he needs it and is intelligent enough to recognize, and admit, that such help is often needed. Accordingly, he is also enthusiastic in his help to others, recognizing with empathy the similarities of their needs and his. Thus, the leader leads by example with his enthusiasm and his eagerness both to seek and give help for goal attainment.

People work best, and in a more cooperative fashion, when they understand what they are expected to do and why their participation is necessary. The communicative skills of the leader play an important role in the creation of an atmosphere of cooperative effort. Efficient use of the human resources demands communication, coordination, and cooperation, and the effective leader realizes this. Accordingly, he works for two-way communication, aimed at understanding and acceptance, through conscious application of the principle of feedback for both participants of every confrontation. He recognizes, too, the effect of attitude on communication, coordination, and cooperation and strives to keep his thinking and, hence, his attitude constructive at all times. He avoids the caustic results of negativism in thinking and attitude and the impact of such negativism on his people.

A good leader might also be considered a

part-time public relations specialist. People in successful group operations accomplish much that is worthy of display to others. The leader realizes this and does his part for the group by publicizing the accomplishments of his people individually and in group. He will work for his own professional development and encourage the same in his people in recognition that the work itself constitutes an important element for job satisfaction and human motivation. Thus, with his understanding and enthusiasm he encourages performance, innovation, creativity, and initiative.

Loyalty is an essential ingredient for effective leadership, and it must be displayed without equivocation. The leader, if he desires to remain so, must develop and evidence his loyalty to his people, his boss, and his organization. This should in no way be interpreted to require blind loyalty in which the boss, the unit, and the people can do no wrong because, obviously, there is always that likelihood. Normally, however, the boss, the unit, and the people act effectively, and the leader's significant contributions are loyalty and support through decisions based on a sounder foundation than hoped-for popularity.

Not all people will live up to the leader's expectations. The leader needs to recognize that sometimes a person will disappoint him, but he should not permit this recognition to become an expectation—for the obvious reasons already discussed. Sometimes the natural rivalry that exists in the group will encourage some individual to overextend himself and create a condition in which he cannot perform as expected. Other times an individual, for any of a wide range of reasons, just will not contribute as the leader expects. Thus, the leader must accept the probability of some individual failure, some disappointment, and be prepared to deal with it in a manner consistent with the situation and the person.

Error and failure are human frailties with which the leader must cope, in himself and others. Perfection continuously has little proba-

bility of occurrence, so the leader has to accept that he will commit errors and be exposed to the same in the efforts of others. This is not to say that error and failure should be condoned under any or all circumstances, but their probability must be accepted. This creates a situation in which the leader must define for himself the fine line dividing honest error/failure and inadequate performance.

the leader helps

Truly effective leadership requires the leader to help his people realize and use the talents and abilities of the other people of the unit. In this manner a cooperative approach to group success is formulated, and no one in the unit feels he is alone in his efforts to succeed. In defense organizations, such an environment is vital for mission capability because today's sophisticated weaponry has made the one-man victor highly improbable. Rather, military missions today are successfully accomplished only through the cooperative use of the skills of many, directed with coordination for a common purpose. For this reason, the skill of the leader helping to instill an active cooperative spirit becomes a tremendously significant determinant for consistently successful group performance.

The leader helps his people come to grips with understanding that the varieties of backgrounds represented in the group will cause some ideological conflict that should be used for the common good. Progress is usually sparked by such conflict if the participants accept the fact that there is normally more than one way to skin the cat. Such acceptance paves the road to an intelligent judgment of the other person's point of view and offers a logical means by which the opinions of all participants are continually altered until agreement is reached. This form of confrontation in which each participant reacts with understanding is dynamic and innovative, offering the group a much wider range of alternatives for problem solution.

Active and dedicated people want to grow

in knowledge, experience, and ability. The effective leader, recognizing this, helps his people by urging them not to be restrained in their healthy curiosity by the artificial barriers of the formal organization chart. In this manner, the leader encourages his people to accommodate their curiosity, stretch into new experience areas, and enhance their understanding of the needs and accomplishments of others united with them for the common organizational objectives. Thus, communication is facilitated, coordination is made more likely, and cooperation is gained from a willingness on the part of all.

Success invokes change, and change can be frightening or disturbing when people do not understand what results are likely from the suggested alteration of the familiar. This appears to hold true even though all humans have been exposed to constant change throughout their lives. Despite the constancy of change and the normal human desire to improve, life in an organizational endeavor seems to carry with it a desire to retain the status quo. Inconsistent as this may be, the leader must still cope with it and simultaneously cope with the need for and problems of change and help his people to adopt and accept.

The consistently successful organization dynamically functions within a framework of constant change. Each job performance, every conversation, each ideological conflict—all alter the capacity and capability of the persons who make the organization and thus change the organization. Such change must be expected, as must be the changes resulting from the outside world's technology and its cultural, economic,

and social stretching. No person or organization can be fully insulated from these stimuli. Military organizations are likely to feel even more of this change impact because of the transiency of population and the ever present pressures of urgent alterations occasioned by world politics and mission emphases. For these reasons, the ability of the military leader to help his people adapt to change becomes significant for the unit. He cannot afford to be overly sold on the established routine of requirement, process, or procedure. Instead, he must adopt the philosophy of grace: progress is impossible without change, so he should make change a graceful and beneficial process for his unit.

THE MILITARY LEADER is not successful alone. He needs and relies upon the efforts of other people to accomplish the unit mission. Accordingly, the military leader is, in fact, a manager of people, and to be effective he must provide himself a conscious program aimed at knowing his people and how best to use them in the current and projected situations. It should be emphasized that the leader's effort to better his ability to use people must not be left to chance. He may, in fact, over time become quite proficient by random situational learning; but not many would disagree that, in sum, this is likely to be an expensive and often disappointing process. Therefore, this article urges a purposeful effort to learn and apply learned knowledge to the task of managing people—a task that can be psychically and tangibly rewarding when done well and successfully.

School of Systems and Logistics, AFIT

Military Affairs Abroad

VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE TECHNICAL TRAINING, 1970-1971

CAPTAIN DRUE L. DEBERRY

PRESIDENT NIXON, speaking at Guam in 1969, announced a new American foreign policy, a policy based on the premise that peace in Asia would depend primarily on Asian solutions to Asian problems. The United States would honor commitments in Asia and elsewhere by providing technical and economic assistance to its allies when requested and as appropriate, but American military presence was to assume a lower profile. We would look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing manpower for its defense.

This policy had particular significance for the

United States Air Force because of the technical requirements for air war. If Air Force assistance was to be effectively provided, technical training of allied air forces would assume even greater importance than it had in the past. With this in mind it is worthwhile to review USAF technical training efforts in Vietnam and examine that experience for methods that are appropriate to the future lower profile of American military presence in Asia and reliance on Asian solutions to Asian problems.

American policy in Vietnam in 1970 and 1971 was aimed at self-sufficiency for the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).



Self-sufficiency was understood to mean that after withdrawal of American combat forces the RVNAF could maintain the level of security that had been won jointly by the United States and South Vietnam. The United States would continue to provide materiel support for the defense of South Vietnam, but it was expected that the RVNAF would have the capability to use United States equipment effectively. If that capability could be developed, the RVNAF would be judged self-sufficient.

Training was the key to VNAF self-sufficiency, and the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP) was a major training effort. Training had to meet two essential objectives for the VNAF to become self-sufficient: (1) personnel had to be trained to meet the immediate needs of expansion, and (2) the VNAF had to expand its capability to train replacements for personnel lost through attrition.

In terms of sheer numbers of personnel, the requirements for expansion far exceeded the requirements for attrition, so it was during the expansion phase that USAF assistance would be most necessary. By January 1970 the VNAF had grown to a personnel strength of over 30,000 men, but fully half this number were unskilled. In March 1971 CRIMP authorized a VNAF strength increase of about 50 percent over the 1970 figures. This CRIMP addition of untrained personnel brought the technical training requirement for 1970 and the first six months of 1971 to nearly 34,000, and this figure included only those personnel to be trained to perform at the lowest skill level. Upgrade training also had to be conducted. Massive United States assistance was required to meet these requirements for expansion.

It was in reaching the second essential goal, expanding the VNAF capability to train replacements for attrition losses, that self-sufficiency would have to stand the acid test. The extent of United States assistance required to train attrition replacements after satisfying the initial expansion requirements would provide a subjective measure of VNAF self-sufficiency. The

interrelationship between these two training objectives clearly emerged as planning progressed.

VNAF technical training had to be conducted in South Vietnam, rather than in the United States. The most compelling reason for this was the number of personnel who required training and the time available. The increased pace of unit activations and the increased total number of units directed by CRIMP required that more people be trained and trained sooner. To train in the United States, VNAF recruits had to learn English; and the Saigon English Language School, the starting point in the training pipeline to the United States, could not provide enough graduates to meet the quotas. Thus in-country training conducted in the Vietnamese language was the only practical solution to this dilemma.

In 1969 every VNAF technical training requirement was evaluated to determine if the United States or South Vietnam was the more suitable training location. A conference convened at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, in June of that year identified the courses to be established in South Vietnam and the equipment required to support those courses. Seventeen hard-core aircraft maintenance courses were among those identified. These were new courses specially designed to meet VNAF needs. Instead of general helicopter maintenance, for example, a course was designed to teach UH-1 helicopter maintenance, since the VNAF would not possess the variety of helicopters usually studied in USAF Air Training Command helicopter courses. The creation of these basic courses marked the beginning of a major transformation in the entire VNAF technical training program and forged a closer relationship between the immediate objective of expansion and the long-range goal of self-sufficiency.

Pacer Bravo was the name given to the VNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (VNAF I&M) plan to establish the seventeen basic aircraft maintenance skill courses in South Vietnam. (See accompanying list.) To

VNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION BASIC
TECHNICAL TRAINING COURSES

AFSC	COURSE TITLE
301X1	Navigation Systems Repairman
421X1	Aircraft Propeller Repairman
421X2	Pneudraulics Repairman
421X3	Aerospace Ground Equipment Repairman
422X0	Instrument Repairman
422X1	Mechanical Accessory Repairman
422X2	Egress Systems Repairman
423X0	Aircraft Electrician
424X0	Fuel Systems Repairman
431X0	Helicopter Maintenance Repairman
431X1A	Aircraft Maintenance Repairman (recip)
431X1C	Aircraft Maintenance Repairman (Jet)
432X0	Jet Engine Repairman
432X1	Reciprocating Engine Repairman
461X0	Munitions Specialist
462X0	Weapons Specialist

provide the instructors for these courses, 243 VNAF maintenance technicians were carefully selected for training in the United States on the specific system they would later teach. This training was conducted by basic technical schools and applicable field training detachments. Following this, the VNAF graduates attended the USAF Air Training Command instructor course. Finally, they returned to South Vietnam to establish schools at the VNAF Air Training Center at Nha Trang Air Base and satellite schools at Tan Son Nhut AB and Bien Hoa AB.

USAF assistance did not stop after the instructors were trained. On 25 January 1970 the first element of two Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) arrived in South Vietnam to assist the VNAF instructors in establishing the new courses. From then until 7 May 1971, elements of these two MTT's were in South Vietnam, some for only a few months and others for nearly a year. Many of the MTT members had taught the new VNAF instructors in the United States, so there was real continuity between preparation and application.


In addition to training VNAF instructors and providing MTT's, the USAF built training aids for the new courses. In all, 869 training aids were specifically designed and fabricated for VNAF use. These training aids were built at USAF Air Training Command Technical Training Centers.

The Pacer Bravo courses began in March 1970, and by 30 June 1971 there were 5599 VNAF graduates, with an additional 1414 students in training. Pacer Bravo was geared to the immediate requirements of CRIMP; in fact, but for these requirements it might not have been attempted.

Pacer Enhance was a related program established to provide expendable items required to support Pacer Bravo. Such items as paper, pencils, and slide projectors were sent to assure that minor as well as major training materials would be available. By July 1971 it was apparent that the Pacer projects represented one of the most successful training experiments ever attempted as part of a United States military assistance program.



One problem still had not been fully solved and warranted further attention. An initial advantage of Pacer Bravo was that the Vietnamese students need not understand English, since the in-country courses were taught in Vietnamese. However, most of the technical manuals used by the VNAF were in English. To be useful to many of the Pacer Bravo graduates, these manuals would have to be translated into Vietnamese.

The job performance aid (JPA) represented one important effort to overcome this difficulty. JPAs were maintenance manuals written in both Vietnamese and English, designed jointly by the Air Force Systems Command, the Air Force Logistics Command, and the XYZYX Corporation. (See accompanying sample pages.) Manuals for UH-1, CH-47, and C-123 aircraft had been produced by June 1971. These manuals relied on simpler language, more pictures, and learning by doing, but they were not designed to replace technical manuals needed for



Pacer Bravo: a member of a USAF Mobile Training Team watches as a Vietnamese former student conducts a class on aircraft landing gear systems at Nha Trang Air Base, South Vietnam.

Pacer Bravo training aids: an aircraft hydraulic system mockup . . . and an aircraft engine



guidance in performing the more complicated maintenance tasks.

The Pacer Bravo courses established a substantial VNAF technical training capability in South Vietnam. With this basic experience and with the proven success of the Pacer Bravo courses as encouragement, increased emphasis was placed on employing MTT's in South Vietnam. These MTT's covered a wide variety of specialties, including such skills as UNIVAC 1050-II computer operations and counterintelligence. Like the Pacer Bravo courses, the MTT effort made a significant contribution toward

increasing VNAF skills and developing training self-sufficiency.

In January 1970 there were eight schools at the VNAF Air Training Center at Nha Trang AB: a liaison pilot training school, an air liaison officer and forward air controller air ground operations school (ALO/FAC-AGOS), a technical school, a general services school, a communications and electronics school, a military training school, an English-language school, and an air base defense school. Together these schools were scheduled to train nearly 4500 students in calendar year (CY) 1970. The Air Training Cen-

UH-1 job performance aid

JPA UH-1H-2-9

INSTALL ANTI-COLLISION LIGHT

Install Anti-Collision Light Lamp OUTB.

NOTE

If light is to be installed, go to next page.

1. Check that lens (3) is not cracked or broken. Check that base (6) is not cracked or broken.
2. Place bulb (4) into bulb receptacle (5). Depress and turn bulb to secure.
3. Install lens (3) on base. Place retaining ring (1) at installed position. Tighten screw (2).

CAUTION

Follow-on maintenance action required: Operational Check Anti-Collision Light.

GẮN ĐÈN NGỪ ĐUNG

Gắn bóng đèn đèn ngừa đụng.


GHÌ CHÚ

Nếu phải gắn đèn, xem trang kế tiếp.

1. Kiểm kính đèn (3) không bị nứt hoặc bể. Kiểm đế (6) không bị nứt hoặc gãy.
2. Gắn bóng (4) vào ổ đèn (5). Ấn và xoay bóng để gắn chắc.
3. Gắn đèn (3) vào đế. Đặt vòng giữ (1) tại vị trí gắn. Siết vít (2).

LƯU Ý

Công tác bảo trì cần thực tiếp tục: Phải kiểm hoạt động của đèn ngừa đụng.



ter actually exceeded that schedule and trained 6800 students in 1970.

By 1969 a command and staff school (equivalent to USAF Squadron Officer School) had been added, and the technical school had been expanded considerably. During cy 1971 over 12,000 students were programmed to graduate from the Air Training Center schools. In 1971, plans were also under consideration to establish T-37 undergraduate pilot training (UPT) as well as helicopter pilot training (HPT) at Nha Trang AB. Navigators were already being trained by the VNAF at Tan Son Nhut by June 1971.

The last VNAF helicopter student pilots programmed to be trained in the United States departed South Vietnam on 25 June 1971. The last students scheduled to enter fixed-wing training left for the United States in early 1972.

The United States had agreed to train a number of pilots for the VNAF, and as that figure was approached in 1972, the need for a VNAF UPT school would increase. In July 1971 the director of training of the Air Force Advi-


sory Group (AFGP) saw the need to provide the VNAF with the capability to replace pilot losses as the greatest challenge to self-sufficiency yet to be met. The planned UPT course, if adopted, would solve this problem. Except for pilot training and a few highly technical skills, the VNAF appeared self-sufficient in training by June 1971.

One development that indicated the technical growth of the VNAF in 1971 was the flight of the TP-001, the first aircraft ever built in South Vietnam. Components of this aircraft were manufactured by hand at various VNAF bases. The engine and the landing gear were the only basic components not built in South Vietnam.

In February 1970 a Seventh Air Force plan provided for integration of VNAF personnel into 7AF units and into some United States Army helicopter units for training. This unprecedented plan complemented the VNAF training program and the USAF MTT training by giving newly trained men experience on the job. By 30 June 1971 over 3000 VNAF personnel had completed this training.



Colonel Oanh, Commander of the VNAF Air Training Center at Nha Trang AB, prepares for a flight in the TP-001, the first airplane ever built in South Vietnam.



VNAF airmen work side by side with United States Army personnel of the 205th Aviation Company.

The integrated training program (ITP) required close coordination between the Air Force Advisory Group, 7AF, and the VNAF. It was most easily conducted at joint-use bases because there only training was required. At sole-use bases (Cam Ranh, Phu Cat, and Phan Rang) billeting support was also required.

Two types of integrated training were conducted: familiarization and upgrade. In familiarization training VNAF personnel gained experience but were not awarded a higher skill level. Those successfully completing upgrade training in a 7AF unit, on the other hand, were awarded a higher skill level by the VNAF. Testing by 7AF units was largely subjective. If the Vietnamese trainee performed satisfactorily on the job, he was recommended for upgrade.

VNAF on-the-job training (OJT) effectiveness was initially limited by the small number of experienced supervisors available relative to the mass of people to be trained. During this period the ITP carried the brunt of responsibility for providing experience and job training to recent technical school graduates.

In January 1970 more VNAF students were trained in ITP than OJT, but by May 1971 this condition was reversed. Between January 1970 and June 1971, 4326 VNAF personnel completed either familiarization or upgrade training through OJT, and 1934 of these were upgraded.

During 1970 and early 1971 VNAF personnel were allowed to enter OJT and ITP for either familiarization or upgrade because the results were the same—the man gained increased proficiency in a skill. Improved skills without higher skill levels, however, made personnel planning very difficult. It was almost impossible for USAF managers to measure training progress. This was less of a problem for VNAF managers, who relied more on personal contact and less on statistics for personnel management. By March 1971, however, the continued emphasis by USAF advisers on the need for higher skill levels caused a marked shift from familiarization training to upgrade training.

In 1970 and 1971 the VNAF experienced a

major reorganization with the activation of five air divisions. One facet of that reorganization was the expansion of the Air Logistics Wing at Bien Hoa AB into an Air Logistics Command (ALC) on the same command level as the air divisions. The thrust of reorganization throughout the VNAF was directed toward absorbing units programmed for activation as part of CRIMP and toward more efficient management and effective employment of all Vietnamese air resources. To that end, the ALC was required to provide depot-level maintenance and logistics support for the entire VNAF. Logistics training was the key to providing the required support, and in 1970 and 1971 considerable effort was devoted to training programs at ALC.

ALC acquired and occupied a new formal training compound in late 1970. The new facilities were a decided improvement and included billets, classrooms, and a USAF dining hall. With the transfer of the dining hall to the VNAF, students began receiving regular meals in the training area for the first time, and morale and performance were measurably improved.

Training literature was ordered and received for all courses taught by ALC, and over eighty 16-mm training films were also ordered. The literature was acquired from USAF ATC Technical Training Centers and was in English; the films were to be made specifically for the ALC training program and would be in Vietnamese.

Formal training, OJT, ITP, and USAF Mobile Training Teams were all employed. In 1970, 454 students graduated from formal training, and 1883 were scheduled to graduate in 1971. Courses included metals processing, corrosion control, supply accounting, and others related to ALC functions, but students were drawn from the air divisions as well as ALC. Many of these courses would eventually be taught by the Air Training Center (ATC) at Nha Trang AB, but until training facilities and instructors were available at Nha Trang, they would be taught by ALC personnel.

Seven MTT's conducted courses at ALC in 1970 and 1971. Twenty depot personnel were

trained as console operators for the UNIVAC 1050-II computer acquired by ALC in March 1970. Two MTT's helped establish depot-level maintenance on communication systems in late 1970 and early 1971. A supply MTT was scheduled to arrive at Bien Hoa AB in September 1971 to establish four new supply courses and train VNAF instructors.

During the first six months of 1971, 196 ALC airmen and NCO's upgraded to five-level skills through OJT, and five airmen upgraded as a result of ITP. Another 29 received familiarization training through ITP.

Thus, technical training at Air Logistics Command was a significant feature of the Improvement and Modernization Program. As a result, important progress was made toward self-sufficiency during this period.

By June 1971 it was apparent that one critical facet of establishing VNAF self-sufficiency—a sound and viable technical training program—had been achieved. The breakthrough had occurred in 1969 with the initiation of the Pacer

Bravo and Pacer Enhance programs. Throughout 1970 and 1971, MTT's, ITP, VNAF OJT, and the Air Training Center steadily improved the competence of VNAF personnel in a wide variety of skills and qualified the VNAF to perpetuate that competence. Each of the training programs played a significant role in the overall accomplishment. By mid-1971 VNAF self-sufficiency in technical training seemed assured.

But perhaps the most significant result of the USAF role in training the VNAF was yet to appear. The USAF experience emphasized that in the long run the most productive approach to providing technical military assistance is to train allied instructors in the United States, whenever practical, and then assist them in establishing a training capability in their own country and in their own language. The USAF experience in Vietnam confirmed the value of exporting the training rather than importing the students.

United States Air Force Academy

In My Opinion



JUNIOR OFFICER PERSPECTIVES OF USAF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

Will I Be a Desiccated Staff Lieutenant Colonel at Forty?

COLONEL VICTOR F. PHILLIPS, JR.

THE POIGNANTLY searching question that forms part of the title of this article appears in Ward Just's book *Military Men*.¹ It might well be asked by junior officers in today's Air Force and provides the thesis for this article: lieutenants and captains contemplating Air Force career status are influenced by their observations of blue-suit middle management.

In recent years the military establishment has placed great emphasis on enticing the junior officer to join and remain in the ranks of careerists. These efforts, as manifested by increased pay, greater responsibility, career development programs, and interpersonal interaction between superior and subordinate, are to be commended. The payoff, presumably, is in a higher retention rate among "quality" officers com-

pleting their initial tours of active duty. This concentration of attention on younger officers leads me to believe that we may be neglecting the equally important middle management segment. Perhaps "neglect" is too strong, but certainly there has been less articulation about the "middlers." Yet it is this segment of Air Force managers toward which the younger officers direct no small amount of attention in assessing their own future.

As a student of management and organization, I recognize the pitfalls in arbitrarily segmenting management into "lower," "middle," and "upper." For the sake of convenience in this instance, I would classify USAF officers with less than 10 years' commissioned service as lower management, between 10 and 20 as middle management, and above 20 as top management. Admittedly, this classification fails to account for the particular job a person holds or for exceptions such as the "fast burners" who are colonels and commanders or directors at less than 20 years of service. However arbitrary my divisions, I believe they are reasonable and generally accurate.

I have the uneasy feeling that, generically speaking, we accept Air Force officers in middle management (my definition) as a "given." That is, they are pretty well committed to a career once they pass the 10-year mark, and we need not be that much concerned about their retention. We are, of course, concerned about something called "career progression" for this group. These officers are past the initiation rites and are now supposedly demonstrating some capacity to rise to top management. There are transfers, school attendance, staff or line assignments, and all the other, perhaps too frequent, "good stuff" that moves this group along toward the top. Yet there is also a certain amount of perceived square-filling and some jobs that must be performed although seemingly unrelated to top managerial development.

Many people feel that providing junior officers with better pay and jobs of greater responsibility represents the best way to induce

them to stay on active duty after the initial tour. While partially agreeing, I maintain that an important variable in the decision model has been overlooked or not sufficiently considered: the junior officer, in deciding on his future, looks ahead 10 or so years and asks, "What is that group doing, for that is where I will be fairly soon?" To contemplate the long run (temporally speaking) is to see most colonels and general officers gainfully employed and well paid. But that is a long time away; what lies between now, the alpha, and star rank, the omega, in the junior officers' perspectives is middle management.

My reasoning about the middle management role in the Air Force as a decision variable for junior officers is partly intuitive and partly empirical. Last year, I was privileged to be a member of a group of officers that conducted an Executive Management Seminar for selected Second Air Force (SAC) commanders and key staff at a West Coast base. Concurrently, we were able to interact at some length with the base Junior Officer Council. The Council appeared to be a representative cross-sectional mix of rank, age, jobs, and career/noncareer intentions. Most of the Council members seemed satisfied with their present jobs and pay. One point that appeared to cause dissatisfaction was their "look down the road" toward the middle management area. Several examples were cited to illustrate their feelings that majors and lieutenant colonels were being under or improperly utilized. The Council members generally felt that they and their contemporaries occupied or were undergoing training to occupy positions of responsibility and challenge, had minimum complaints about present pay, but were concerned that if they committed themselves to a USAF career the job challenges tended to diminish or stagnate as they entered middle management. At least from their present perspectives, this view seemed to be the way things are. I have since talked with other junior officers and find general agreement with these feelings.

What are some implications of the junior officers' attitudes about middle management? First, it appears obvious that the USAF has made quantum strides to satisfy junior officers during their initial tours of duty. The gains are there, but more will need to be done on a continuing basis. Second, perhaps we have paid less attention than we should to the longer time perspective. We have become preoccupied with the here and now time frame of the first-termers and have concentrated on upgrading their work and pay. In stressing these items to this group, we may have neglected their intermediate future. Implicitly, we may be saying, "Aren't you happy and fulfilled now? And look what the future holds for you at the colonel/general level!" The junior officer may respond, "Yes, things are going reasonably well now, and I am aware of the fine opportunities that await me if and when I get to top management in the Air Force. What concerns me is what lies between now and then. Will the path be exciting or stultifying?"

Again from Ward Just's *Military Men*, "How do you get an innovative, aggressive man through the middle management of the Army, where life can be very, very dull?"² I believe that in the Air Force we need some re-evaluation and explanation. The re-evaluation should be directed at sustained assessment of our middle managers and their jobs, and the explanation should address what the middle manager is doing and why it is necessary for him to do it.

The middle management segment of the Air Force is large in sheer numbers in addition to being geographically and job disparate. It is difficult in a number of variables to compare the USAF on a one-to-one basis with civilian industrial firms, which are often held up to us as paragons of organizational virtue. The apparent conclusion that large civilian organizations are better able to track their managers through the middle years of management by providing them with a continuing series of meaningful jobs is not altogether germane—or accurate. Even in some large private sector

firms, middle management numbers only a few hundred or less, as opposed to the literally thousands in the Air Force. Do we, then, just give up and rationalize that Air Force middle management is too large to handle? I think not. The "morale" construct is difficult to understand, quantifiably measure, and work with, but I am not aware of any manager worth his salt who neglects it. So, too, Air Force middle management, while large, diverse, and not easy to handle, needs continuing attention.

In evaluating middle management, we certainly do not want to glamorize it just to present a bright, but false, picture to junior officers. We do need to take a closer look at a couple of concepts. First, are we providing real management jobs and opportunities for our middle managers? Are they spending 90 percent of their time in routine duties that contribute less than 10 percent to the mission? Are they forced by fiat or neglectful supervision to expend 90 percent of their energy on items constituting 1 percent of their budget? Are we forcing them to be so involved with "Mickey Mouse" work that they become discouraged and obsessed with the hygiene (job environment) factors, while the motivational (job itself) factors, such as recognition, sense of achievement, etc., go wanting?³

Second, the idea of forced, multivaried assignments needs re-evaluation. I am not sure that periodic transfers and school attendance are always cost-effective or experientially worthwhile, at least to the degree required of our middle managers, who perceive that getting their "tickets punched" at the "right" times and places is mandatory for success. We may have established a self-fulfilling prophecy: Those whom we promote are those who have had their tickets punched; therefore, the proper route to the top is to get your ticket punched. I am not sure that the acquisition of needed experience, sagacity, and eclectic leadership is always enhanced by the generally applicable policy of periodic changing of jobs, attendance at schools, etc.

Third, we should attempt to implement better performance evaluation and human asset accounting procedures.⁴ Fourth, the people at DCS/P, Military Personnel Center, and the Human Resources Laboratory should be encouraged to take a closer look at middle management, but obviously not to the exclusion of lower and top management.

Finally, the emphasis in career management should be on a sequential, sustained basis: "Organizational development is concerned not solely with the individual, nor solely with the organization, but with the symbiotic and synergistic relationship between them."⁵

The "explanation" that I mentioned previously is really nothing but a rationale. It forces us to ask "Why," to assess, to re-evaluate, and then to articulate what we are doing. I have the feeling that some of the skeptical looks being cast at USAF middle management by junior officers are due in part to a lack of

well-founded explanations of the functions and purposes of 10- to 20-year officers. We need to address the issue of what positive things are being done for middle management to encourage junior officers to aspire to that step on the ladder to the top.

The question which forms the subtitle of this article is not rhetorical. We cannot assure every young officer that he will be Chief of Staff and that each step along the way will be one of glamor and maximization of self-actualization. But we can provide him with better perspectives to help him analyze his Air Force future, especially in the transitional years of middle management. Junior officers will always have opinions on the attractiveness of being a staff lieutenant colonel at forty, but words like "desiccated" should not be a preconceived factor in their judgment.

Air War College

Notes

1. Ward Just, *Military Men* (New York: Avon Books, 1972), p. 153.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 230.
3. Frederick Herzberg, *Work and the Nature of Man* (New York: World Publishing Co., 1966), Chapters 6-8.
4. George Berkowitz, "The Big New Move to Measure Managers," *Dun's*, September 1971, pp. 60-64. Also, see such books as *Appraising Managers as Managers* by Harold Koontz and *Evaluating and Improving Managerial Per-*

formance by Virgil Rowland. The interdependent subjects of human asset accounting and measurement of managerial performance need a great deal of attention and study. Further consideration of them is beyond the purview of this article.

5. Daniel Kegan, "Organizational Development: Description, Issues and Some Research Results," *Academy of Management Journal*, December 1971, p. 454.

A SELECTIVE AIRMAN RECRUITING PROGRAM

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT W. DAVIS

WITH a phase-down in the number of men drafted each month and a look toward the time when involuntary entry into the service will be a part of the past, some new recruiting approaches have been introduced. Additional steps are necessary, however, to attract the desired quality and quantity of personnel into the Air Force.

At present all Air Force recruits are generally treated alike regarding their selection of Air Force specialty, pay, movement of dependents and household goods, technical schooling, and on-the-job training, regardless of the skill possessed and the skill level achieved prior to enlistment. A concerted effort should be initiated to enlist men who *are qualified* in an Air Force-related skill. These men would be compensated for their ability by enlistment at a grade higher than E-1, plus other benefits. The cost would be offset through money saved by not having to train them.

In an address at the Air Force Recruiting Conference on 10 August 1971, Air Force Chief of Staff General John D. Ryan said that over half of the Air Force recruits were motivated by the draft and that for the first time in five years the Air Force had failed to meet its year-end nonprior-service recruiting objective.¹

The current recruitment problem is not limited to quantity only, which is no longer too critical; Air Force figures show there has also been a drop in quality. In a study of more than 14,000 airmen recruited in 1970, a comparison was made of the aptitude indexes of men with high draft numbers and those with low draft numbers. It was found that the men with high draft numbers, who were assured or relatively assured of *not* being called, had substantially

lower index scores than the men in the assured-of-being-drafted group.² As the draft is phased out, it can be assumed that both of these problem areas, quantity and quality, will increase. To meet its manpower needs, the Air Force might be forced to look to other personnel resource areas besides the 18- and 19-year-old untrained high school graduate. Traditionally, the Air Force has drawn from the 18- and 19-year-olds and then, at considerable expense, trained them through technical schools and on-the-job training.

Briefly, the present Air Force enlistment program operates in the following manner. The prospective recruit is administered the airman qualification examination, and an aptitude index is established in each of four broad areas: electronic, mechanical, general, and administrative. If the individual achieves a qualifying score (40 or more) in one or more of the aptitude indexes, he is counseled by the recruiter on the jobs for which he has qualified. The individual may enlist in one of the AFSC's offered under the Guaranteed AFSC Program or enlist in the broad aptitude area, with classification into a specific AFSC during basic training. Enlistment, however, is contingent upon the availability of a vacancy in the aptitude area or AFSC chosen by the applicant. After testing and selection of specialty, the recruit is sent to Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, for six weeks of basic Air Force training. After completing basic training, he is sent to a technical school or to his first duty base, where he will receive on-the-job training. While at Lackland the basic airman may take the Specialty Bypass Test and possibly forego technical training school. After graduation from technical school,

he is sent to an Air Force base where he will start working in his specialty area and continue his training through on-the-job training programs.

The first-term airman's progress through the enlisted grades is as follows: during basic training his grade is E-1; upon completion of four months' time in service he is promoted to E-2; if he progresses normally in training, eight months later he is promoted to E-3; and after an additional 14 months he is promoted to E-4. At this point it is generally considered that he is not yet a fully productive airman. (Of course this depends to some degree on his job specialty.) However, more than half of his four-year enlistment period is over, and a considerable amount of money has been spent in teaching him a skill.

A manpower resource area that has not been fully exploited by the Air Force concerns individuals who have an Air Force-needed skill that was acquired through civilian schooling or training. In the present system of recruiting, these individuals are offered the same enlistment incentives as the unskilled person. As a result the Air Force has had little success in competing with industry for these skilled individuals. The belief that a man is not trained unless he has been trained by the Air Force is neither a valid nor a profitable one. With a few changes in Air Force regulations and some legislative action, a different path could be paved for selected individuals who have a usable skill at the time of entry into the Air Force.

It should be emphasized that the following proposal does not apply to the majority of new recruits. It is directed only toward those individuals who have received considerable training, formal or otherwise, prior to enlistment. As such, it should be considered an additional recruiting program.

To illustrate how this program may work, consider a man twenty-three years old with a wife and two children. He has approximately a year of vocational schooling and three or four years of on-the-job experience. In view of the

normal progression described above, would this man seriously consider entry into the Air Force? Experience indicates that he would not. However, if it were possible to determine that he had a high degree of skill in a job specialty which the Air Force needed, it would definitely be advantageous to enlist him and make proper use of his skill.

It is proposed that his basic training period at Lackland Air Force Base be shortened because of his maturity and responsibility. Following the shortened basic training, he would go to his first duty base with only enough leave time, prior to reporting, to assist in the movement of his family. Thus, shortly after his enlistment he would be a productive airman, not an airman in an expensive training program.

This proposed program would have these advantages: expenses incident to a full basic training course would be reduced; cost of attending a technical school would be eliminated; man-hours that would otherwise be expended by an on-the-job training instructor while the new airman was undergoing on-the-job training through at least the five skill level would be eliminated; and, with the exception of a few weeks in basic training, the entire enlistment period would be productive.

Up to this point it has been shown that considerable savings in both man-hours and dollars would accrue to the Air Force. But how can the Air Force attract this kind of skilled individual away from the civilian competition? Since he has more to offer than the majority of the recruits now enlisting, the incentives would have to be greater.

The first incentive area to consider would be salary; and since the military pay system is tied to grade, an entry grade higher than E-1 would be necessary. How much higher than E-1 would be a function of the specialty area and demonstrated skill level. If a five-level skill were the required minimum, then entry as an E-4 or E-5 would be appropriate. With the recent increases in base pay and quarters allowance, plus fringe benefits and, in some special-

ties, professional pay, the Air Force is becoming competitive with industry.³ Even with these salary increases, however, *it could not be expected that a skilled worker would take a new job at a lower salary level than he can command outside.*

Identifying individuals who would qualify for enlistment at an advanced enlisted grade would not be too difficult. The Air Force already has a considerable number of tests that could be used for this purpose. For instance, the skill-level test given in the 685XO Air Force specialty to a data processing programmer could be used for testing a civilian-trained programmer after removal of all references to specifically Air Force-related questions.

In the example our prospective enlistee is married and has two children. It would be safe to assume that he has some household goods. A definite block to recruiting this man would arise if he had to move his family and household goods at his own expense. Therefore, appropriate legislative action would be required to authorize the same allowances for movement of dependents and household goods as are granted an E-4 with four years of service or an E-5 or higher grade.

An additional incentive would be an agreement, prior to enlistment, on at least the geographic area of initial assignment and preferably the first base assignment.

Points are given for time in service in the Weighted Airman Promotion System. To keep individuals of this select group competitive in the promotion cycle, an award of time-in-service credit would be necessary, for promotion purposes only. If he enlisted as an E-4, his Weighted Airman Promotion System points should reflect time in service equal to two years, which is the phase point when the average airman is promoted to E-4.

Under this proposal, it might appear that the Air Force would be giving more than it received, but when all aspects of the proposition are considered individually it is evident the Air Force would receive a fair return.

Compared to the cost of putting an enlistee through the Air Force technical training courses appropriate to his specialty, the cost of sending an already skilled airman through basic training and then moving him and his family to the first duty station would be minimal. It should be noted here that the Air Force computes the average cost of moving an airman's family, for a permanent change of station, at \$416.⁴

When the total salary paid an airman over a 21½-month period as he progresses from E-1 through E-3 is compared to the total salary of an E-4 or E-5 over the same period, the difference is relatively small.

The monthly salaries in the following table include base pay (under two years for pay), quarters (married), and subsistence allowances at the 1 January 1972 pay rate.⁵

E-1	\$ 438.90/month × 6 weeks	\$ 658.35
E-2	471.60/month × 8 months	3772.80
E-3	484.50/month × <u>12 months</u>	<u>5814.00</u>
	21½ months	\$10245.15
E-4	\$ 514.20/month × 21½ months	\$11055.30
E-5	545.10/month × 21½ months	11719.65
		\$ 11055.30
		<u>- 10245.15</u>
		\$ 810.15
		\$ 11719.65
		<u>- 10245.15</u>
		\$ 1474.50

During the 21½-month period for normal progression from enlistment to E-4, the airman would earn \$10,245.15. An airman who entered the Air Force as an E-4 would earn in the same period \$11,055.30; if he entered at E-5, \$11,719.65. In the first instance he would earn \$810.15 more, in the second instance \$1,474.50 more, than the airman pursuing the normal progression. These differences equate to less than twenty percent of the average cost of many of the technical school courses.

There is another area of concern that would require attention if a program along the lines proposed here were adopted. Unless the pro-

gram was strictly controlled and used only for enlistment of individuals who passed a demanding test, there would be considerable repercussion from within the enlisted ranks. Some airmen and noncommissioned officers would feel that, since they had to work and wait for each of their promotions, everyone else should do the same. However, such repercussion could be minimized by rigidly controlling the program. An obvious precedent for this program is the Airman Education and Commissioning Program (AECIP), which permits an airman close to a college degree to complete his undergraduate work, obtain his degree, and then enter the Air Force as a second lieutenant.

It is interesting to note that, in light of the present attitude of the Air Force regarding where technical training is acquired, the Air Force has an ongoing program at Forbes AFB, Kansas, that gives enlisted men additional train-

ing prior to separation or retirement. This training is in areas unrelated to their Air Force-acquired skill but in trades designated by the Department of Labor as undermanned.⁶

With the supply of Air Force recruits diminished by a less potent draft and with the time coming when the draft will be eliminated, the personnel resource area for prospective recruits must be enlarged. If this can be coupled with the benefits of lower training costs and a longer productive period during an enlistment tour, it is definitely to the advantage of the Air Force to institute a program by which trained and experienced individuals can be recruited.

Air War College

This article has been adapted from a paper prepared by Colonel Davis as part of his academic work while a student in the 1972 class of Air War College.

Notes

1. General John D. Ryan, "Recruiting in the 1970s," *Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders*, Department of the Air Force, Number 10-1971 (October 1971), pp. 1-2.

2. "Post-Draft Decline Feared in AF Quality, Quantity," *Air Force Times*, December 22, 1971, p. 8.

3. "Federal Jobs—What They're Worth Now," *U.S. News and World Report*, January 10, 1972, p. 26.

4. *USAF Cost and Planning Factors*, AFM 172-3, Department of the Air Force, March 31, 1971, p. 19-1.

5. "The Military Selective Service Act," *Commanders Digest*, Vol. 11, No. 3, Department of Defense, November 18, 1971, p. 1; "Basic Pay Rates," *Air Force Times*, December 29, 1971, p. 4.

6. "Skill Center Opens at Forbes Jan. 10," *Air Force Times*, January 5, 1972, p. 3; "Skill Center Drops Limits," *Air Force Times*, January 19, 1972, p. 8.

DIVORCE—MILITARY STYLE

DR. JOHN J. MARSH

IN TERMS of trauma and waste of human potential, there is much similarity between divorce and the military retirement system. Some of the rationale behind our present retirement policy is to make room for young and physically vigorous personnel. Some men, in passing through the "dangerous forties," are prone to cast off their faithful partner of 20-odd years and run off with a younger and more seductive model. One suspects that the Defense Department, like the errant male, may also be interested in new alliances with those who are unaware of weaknesses and don't know where the mistakes are recorded. Economically, the retiree, like the ex-wife, is "bought off" with monthly payments as compensation for past services. In both cases, divorce and retirement, the implication is that the individual cast off is of no further value to the party doing the "ridding."

The points that follow are pertinent to any retirement system; they are essential, and failure to implement them is a waste of human resources. What is proposed is a more positive approach by the military establishment towards retirement and the retiree. The Defense Department must cease to view retirement as the end of its personnel program, a means of paying off the faithful and putting them out to pasture. Retirement must be seen as more than a means to insure an orderly flow of personnel out of the personnel system. Rather, it should be used as a means of moving selected persons into a status that allows them to be of continued value to the defense of the country and to the welfare of society.

Two specific failures of the present military retirement program result from the current "expulsion" philosophy. The first is inadequacy of the system in assisting the retiree to make an orderly and productive transition to the "sec-

ond stage" of his military career. The second is a failure to establish systems and procedures to make use of the retiree's abilities in direct support of military functions during the retirement or "second military" career. These failures are the inevitable result of the "divorce—military style" attitude. We must see the retiree as a valuable asset and not as a used-up resource.

The following proposals offer potential methods for eliminating these failures, at the same time pointing up their extent. No consideration has been given to the fact that laws would have to be changed and costs would have to be met. These are important points, but consideration of them at this stage would be tantamount to negativism. Further, if these or similar proposals are valid, they are of sufficient value—militarily, socially, and economically—to justify a considerable expenditure of funds and legislative/organizational action.

the base retirement center

The first proposal has to do with the inadequacy of the military efforts in assisting the retiree in his transition to civilian life. Following A. H. Maslow's hierarchy of needs, we should look first to the economic and then to the psychological needs, bearing in mind that these needs are not discrete but overlapping.

The economic need of the retiree is his second career, his employment, his wage-earning future. This is the future to which the military personnel system pays too little attention. The existing military personnel records and evaluation systems are equaled by very few others in either the private or governmental sector. The retiree who can take advantage of such records and evaluations may present an unequalled set of credentials to a prospective employer. The military training programs are collectively the

largest and most sophisticated educational and training system in existence. A good portion of this training is readily translatable into salable skills if it can be documented in civilian terms. Many assignments of the senior noncommissioned officer and the officer provide extensive managerial and technological experience. The problem of the prospective retiree is threefold with respect to his personnel records, performance evaluations, training, and experience. First, there is misunderstanding and even prejudice on the part of some segments of government and industry regarding the nature of military duty, training systems, and philosophy of operation. Second, the records-keeping system of the military is not designed to allow for postretirement credentials for employment purposes. Finally, there is a paucity of effort by the military to deal with employment problems of the retiree.

An extensive placement service should be established by the military, a chain of interconnected agencies, one per military installation, with uniform procedures, records, etc. This service should be based on the concept that military personnel are professionals whose capabilities in their second career should be made available in a professional manner for employment that is in keeping with their status. This concept leads to the operation of this program separately from but cooperatively with federal and state employment systems. Experience suggests that the motivation of civil service personnel, federal or state, to assist military retirees in employment leaves something to be desired. This is largely because military retirees tend to seek governmental employment and thus are a threat to civil service personnel. Furthermore, the military should take charge of this service, as it will have a very positive effect on morale and consequently on retention and recruitment.

Such a service should include the following aspects. It should be voluntary, and serious consideration should be given to making it self-supporting by financing it from nonappro-

priated fund sources, fees charged to the retiree, and/or a monthly deduction from pay similar to that for the Old Soldiers Home. It should be standardized Defense-wide with a communications network, forms, regulations, etc. The prospective retiree should come to be interviewed one year before his retirement. An extensive battery of examinations should be administered, such as the Kuder, Strong Vocational Interest Blank, Edwards Personality Preference Schedule, GATB, and other aptitude, interest, personality, and related tests. Vocational guidance should be available with the Veterans Administration, colleges, vocational rehabilitation, and other agencies. The prospective retiree should be furnished data of the Department of Labor on the economic structure of the area he wishes to live in, the occupational outlook for the next ten years in various fields, etc. If he intends to go to school, catalogs, application forms, and advice on admissions should be available. The retirement center should have brochures and employment material from possible employers in the same manner as college and university placement centers.

Standardized forms should be developed for résumés. The retiree's personnel records of his entire military career should be available for data extraction and reproduction. Past and present pay scales should be included for pay progression history, as well as a description of his military training programs and current and past AFSC's, MOS's, etc. The résumé should be prepared by the retiree with the advice of the placement and guidance personnel of the center, who also suggest appropriate places to send it. The center should retain copies of it for use in replying to inquiries seeking personnel with specialized skills and in brochures for distribution at meetings of professional associations.

All the retirement centers should work together cooperatively and not competitively. Every major organization and professional association should be "penetrated." At every convention a consolidated, service-wide listing of

retirees appropriate to that convention should be available. Retirees should be advised of conventions and conferences so that they may personally attend them if they wish. The retirement centers could be linked to a master retirement data center for all services, so that a nationwide search of prospective retirees could be made to satisfy any employer's needs. About the most sophisticated placement system in existence is that for higher education. That model should be carefully examined in planning the philosophy and operational procedures for carrying out this proposal.

The centers should be staffed with personnel experienced in testing, vocational and academic guidance, employment counseling, and placement services. They should work closely with all agencies in the placement and employment counseling fields. They should be familiar with the full range of military training and activities so as to aid effectively in the interpretation of these programs to the civilian labor market. Retirement center personnel should all be qualified to assist the retiree in making the adjustment to civilian life. They should be skilled counselors and knowledgeable in the psychological, sociological, and economic aspects of the retirement process. Ideally, they would be persons who have, themselves, retired from the service and adjusted to the civilian world for several years.

The largely economic preparation for retirement will have tangential implications in the psychological area, but this coverage is not enough. There must also be briefing, training, and orientation programs for the prospective retiree. He should be made aware of the ways in which he should adjust his thinking. As an example, the use of one's military title is taboo in many fields. The standardization and systems approach to administration is anathema to many politically oriented governmental agencies at the local level.

Preparation of the retiree must include the wife in briefings, testings, and evaluations. Many wives of career military are as prone to

misunderstand and misjudge nonmilitary life as are the service members themselves. The wife should participate in any decisions; an inestimable value will accrue in the morale area.

The military is an essentially authoritarian system whose purpose is the development of the unit or the accomplishment of the mission. Individuals are developed as a means to that end. While the development and growth of the individual for his own benefit is not opposed, it is not viewed as a major goal except to the degree that it contributes to the unit mission. On the other hand, many elements of civilian life see individual growth as second to nothing. Retraining is necessary for many military personnel so they can adjust to the civilian world without becoming alienated and seeking refuge in extreme reactionism. An integrated program of lectures, briefings, films, and even structured classes should be made available to prospective retirees. Outside resource personnel should be used, such as faculty of a business department in a nearby university, directors of local employment service offices, personnel managers of large companies, labor union officers, etc.

The preceding set of proposals is designed to prepare the retiree for his second career and to "market" an invaluable human resource effectively to the civilian community. They are not all-inclusive, and certainly alternatives should be proposed. Any proposal must do what has not been done before. To date, we have failed to be aggressive, humanistic, and nonmilitary in our approach.

reconciliation: recycling the retiree

The second set of proposals has to do with the failure of the military establishment to make use of the retiree. He is just a number on a retired roll. We have no *system* for using him to augment the military establishment, to play a role in civil defense, or to participate in the disaster recovery process. We do not even know what skills or talents he may have acquired after retirement, where he is employed, or what professional status he may possess that

could benefit the Defense Department or other federal or state agencies.

Effective use of retirees as an aid to the Defense establishment must be based on a data-gathering system that would encompass the updating of active duty personnel records to show certain selected postretirement information. Education, certain kinds of employment, foreign-language experience, governmental activities, etc., are some of the things that are pertinent. Such a system would allow for the implementation, in whole or in part, of the following proposal.

This proposal is based on the idea that the nation and the individual military retiree are both being deprived of an association that would be mutually beneficial. This assertion requires an analysis of certain factors and an acceptance of certain conclusions to be drawn therefrom. These factors encompass a psychological, sociological, military, economic, and legislative consideration of the military retiree.

Only in the past two decades has any serious study been given to military retirees as a group. Not until the mobilization of World War II and the "commuphobia" that followed has there been a large professional military force and a peacetime draft. These have resulted in a large outpouring of retiring personnel, which started in the early 1960s and will continue for the foreseeable future. It will taper off somewhat but will still be a significant feature of our socioeconomic structure. To put concreteness to this point, one official source has projected that 800,000 military personnel will be on the retired rolls by 1975, 90 percent of them in grades E-7 to O-5, under age 55, and with little or no disability.

All the studies and proposals made to date consider how to ease the adjustment to civilian life. All are predicated upon the concept that service to the nation as a member of the armed forces is finished. The divorce is final, and there are only "occasional visitation rights and alimony" but no right of cohabitation. This concept must be changed. It hurts the military

member, the armed forces, and the nation.

An interrelationship of the retiree and the armed forces should exist, to involve active duty on a voluntary basis with certain emoluments to the individual and benefits to the Defense Department and the civilian community. Before discussing this in detail, let us consider the retiree from the psychological standpoint.

It is rarely admitted by the individual career serviceman that he is in uniform for altruistic reasons. The potential danger from combat and the frequent disruption of normal family life are so great that a price can't be put on them. Whether altruism is the *primary* motivation is debatable; what cannot be denied is that it is a *major* reason for the overwhelming majority of the military, even though some may be unaware of it. From this, a number of conclusions follow. The first is that retirement is a traumatic experience, and one who maintains a healthy state of mind during and after it is a benefit to society. The person who does not is a danger. In the extreme, the individual who is resentful of the change may become a political extremist, a reactionary, an alcoholic, etc. Second, from the idea of "love of service," we can be reasonably certain that a number of retired military desire to continue some association with the armed forces if the associations are flexible in the requirements on the individual and productive rather than "made work" or merely training and indoctrination. Third, since the military member served for altruistic reasons in the first place, he may serve after retirement for something other than a paycheck. He does not want to be put to any significant out-of-pocket expense, but he may not demand special pay. Fourth, we should recognize the "love of service" motive of the individual and respond to it, nurturing it rather than letting it turn to bitterness. From this, there will often be an involvement of the retired military member in the social needs of his community. Youth work, community improvement, and civil defense are all areas that need the peculiar talents of the military. Finally, we should

not overlook the impact upon the man in the service from the contacts and relationships that will result when the retiree "rejoins" the military. The young man in uniform will gain knowledge from the retiree with respect to a service career and retirement for himself.

The second basic premise is that a specific benefit, militarily, will be gained from the periodic use of the retiree in an active duty status. The possibilities are infinite, but let us consider a few of the more obvious. The retiree can serve with a military unit of the civilian components. He can lend his experience, technical knowledge, and guidance to the local Reserve, National Guard, Civil Air Patrol, and ROTC units. He can even do this if they are not of his own service. Imagine the value of a training program for an Army Special Forces Reserve unit conducted by a retired TAC fighter pilot who had served in Vietnam! Consider the indoctrination of a Marine Corps Reserve unit by a retired Navy officer with extensive sea duty in amphibious operations. What of the value rendered to an Air Force Reserve Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron by a retired flight nurse or an Army doctor who had field hospital experience? A retired Coast Guard pilot can brief CAP personnel on sea search techniques. A benefit for recruiting can be realized when a retired service member actively participates in recruiting activities. Small units such as radar stations and recruiting detachments could benefit from the specialized skills of retired personnel in their area to supplement their own resources. The former sanitation specialist, for instance, could help the local radar unit when they have a problem with their sewage disposal system. Or the former squadron commander could help the local recruiting detachment by performing as a summary court for a deceased recruiter. The retiree does not have to be near a military unit to be of assistance. A company many miles from a base might bid on a contract, and the facilities capability determination could be done by a retired member in that community who is knowledgeable of that

segment of industry. The services might wish to rent or lease a piece of property in a certain area for some purpose; a retired member could serve as a contact in making appointments for negotiators, advising them of pertinent industrial facilities, water and power supplies, etc. Of course, the man who is near a military installation can be used in a number of ways. The experience and background of the retired member can be used to fill a temporary gap in assigned manning, handle a special project, render technical advice in a problem area, handle a temporary excess workload, or perform a disinterested management engineering analysis.

A major benefit is the maintenance or upgrading of military skills on the part of the retiree. While the mobilization of retirees may be a remote possibility in the missile age, the military threat has a way of coming full circle. Three times since the end of World War II we have brought obsolete aircraft back from the scrap heap because they were required for military operations. Retired personnel are a valuable asset that must not be allowed to rust away because their skills are thought to be obsolete. They should be kept current for the day when they may comprise the cadre of skills and experience needed for a conventional war. Also we must remember that military personnel, retired and reserve, may be the key to a continuation of civil order after a massive nuclear disaster. Military personnel are especially suited to the creation and operation of the impromptu and authoritative government structure with the command, control, logistical, and communications systems essential for survival after a disaster, man-made or natural. The maintenance of skills of retired military personnel will better enable them to perform this task.

The third basic premise has to do with the individual and what he will obtain from this proposal. We have already spoken of the maintenance of his skills and his familiarization with changing concepts and organizational patterns. We must not overlook the necessity for some material rewards to the individual. These

rewards are divided into two groups. In the first are those that can be put into effect either without legislation or without any legislative difficulty. In the second group are those that would undoubtedly cause considerable debate; most of this group have a price tag on them. At this point, let it be clear that the value of the basic concept is so important that it should be put into effect, even if the emoluments listed here cannot be made available.

First, the retiree should be put on *voluntary* active duty in a nonpay status except for such death or similar benefits as would accrue to him under existing law. The authority to call him to active duty would rest with the commander of any military installation, unit, detachment, office, etc., located off a military installation. These orders could be written or verbal and later confirmed in writing. Some type of performance rating system should exist. Points for the duty performed should be awarded, possibly similar to the present system for the reservist. The points earned plus performance reports would be used for "retirement" promotion consideration. The criteria here could be very similar to that for reserve promotions. This "retirement" promotion would be an official promotion in all respects except for the retirement pay. The title is used and the insignia is worn. It would be similar to the Navy Tombstone promotions of a few years ago. If the resistance the Navy had to the elimination of that system is any indication, this "retirement" promotion should be a strong motivating factor.

The areas that could be added but would be controversial concern travel pay and per diem, clothing allowance for enlisted personnel, and rations and quarters. Could the retiree travel in a TPA status? In some cases it might be necessary. A clothing allowance might be beneficial for the airman, or else a ruling from IRS that the uniform maintenance costs would be deductible. Rations and quarters, in kind, should be available for extended periods of duty and per diem for TDY. An area requiring consider-

able study would be the legal status of these persons with respect to military law, command authority, etc.

In the event of recall to active duty in the true sense of the term, i.e., state of war, mobilization, etc., these persons must be recalled in the grade they may have earned under the "retirement" promotion system. If they then were "re-retired," it would be in higher grades.

An essential to this program is some system of management. First, it must be 100 percent voluntary. It must be flexible, because personal desires must play a part in it. Some could only participate in the summer, others only on evenings, some no more than one or two days at a time. A good number may have so flexible a civilian life that they could serve for several weeks at a time, travel overseas, etc. The individual must not only be free to accept or reject the program but also to withdraw or rejoin as his situation changes. Conversely, the government must be free to reject the individual if his services are unacceptable or if he is too difficult with his "likes and dislikes." A form would be necessary, which the retiree would submit to the base, unit, or activity he wishes to assist. He would indicate his background, experience, availability, etc. Some system of verification would have to exist; also some degree of interview and acceptance at the unit or base. Also, there should be a sharing of the retiree where there are several installations and/or units in one area.

While the personnel management for this program would have some difficulties, this should not close the door to any serious consideration of this proposal. We stand to gain the services of thousands of skilled people for today's military needs, train them for a requirement of tomorrow, benefit the civil government, and improve relations between the military and civilian communities. This has the potential of being measured in hundreds of millions of dollars in value to the nation.

WHAT IS PROPOSED is a fresh new look at the

concept of retirement, a look at what it means to the individual, the armed forces, and to society. From automobiles to admirals, from shoes to sergeants, our society has, for too long, worked on a "use it up and throw it out" philosophy. Our national policies with respect to material goods as well as those dealing with human resources have reflected little consideration for the patina of age in things or in people. The strident demand of our society is to value and use effectively both our physical and our psychological worlds. These proposals regarding military retirement will accomplish two things. We must do as much to help the retiree go into his second career as we do to woo and train him twenty or so years earlier. Also, we

must consider him as an asset to the military establishment and find ways to use him in that capacity after he retires.

Many are the benefits to be realized from such approaches. Retention should improve, the economic health of the retiree should be improved, the morale of personnel should be improved by the demonstration of sincere personal concern, and the effectiveness of the military establishment should be raised. The image of the military should be enhanced by the retiree's greater ability to integrate into the civilian community. Hopefully, such concepts as these may lead to changes in the personnel retirement system of the Defense Department.

Santa Fe, New Mexico



General Maxwell D. Taylor

Books and Ideas

MUST WE BEAT THE SWORD OF LIMITED WAR INTO A PLOWSHARE?

DR. RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY

HAVING been several times a Presidential consultant without immediate responsibility to implement his own advice, General Maxwell Taylor is aware of both the jealousies that such consultants arouse among persons who are saddled with responsibility and the difficulty that the consultant faces in making his advice effective. "In the end," he says, "a consultant is likely to have only the recourse which I have taken: to write a book to show

how much better the world would have been 'had they listened to me.'"[†]

Of course, General Taylor was much less often a consultant than a soldier exercising responsibility and engaged in military action. His book is a memoir that not only tells the world how it might have been better off but also records his career from birth in Keytesville, Missouri, on August 26, 1901, through cadet days at West Point when General MacArthur was superintendent, service and military education between the World Wars (with especially interesting and well-recounted episodes as a language student in Japan and Japanese-language officer at Vinegar Joe Stilwell's side in China), leadership of airborne troops in World War II, command of the Eighth Army late in the Korean War, service as Chief of Staff of the Army under President Eisenhower and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and a tour as ambassador to South Vietnam in the critical year from mid-1964 to mid-1965. Although he reviews his whole career, General Taylor characteristically is not joking when he says he is going to tell how the world could have been made better, and about half the book is taken up with the problems of the Kennedy and Johnson years that are largely still with us, especially the Vietnam war.

In an earlier review published in this journal, I expressed dismay at a species of misuse of historical knowledge which I discerned as a tendency of too many of the architects of the Vietnam policy of the Johnson administration.¹ These men were too thoroughly informed regarding the history of the Cold War in general and United States involvement in Vietnam in particular to be unaware that they were choosing among options when they made their Vietnam policy. Yet they held that their administration was trapped in its Vietnam policy by a previous history that they knew in one sense

too well—in the sense that they could profess to believe that history bound them and cut off their options. General Taylor, who was not among the architects of policy interviewed for the Graff book earlier under review, shows a refreshing willingness to recognize that options existed and choices were consciously made. In particular, Taylor emphasizes the wrong choices made by some American policy-makers in the episode to which he returns repeatedly as a pivotal event of the war: the overthrow and assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem. I agree with the General that reflection and the passage of time make the fall of Diem seem all the more pivotal, and it is a merit of Taylor's book that even if it is not altogether candid about the details of that event, it so well draws out its implications. It is a further merit of Taylor's judgment that, when choices were being made, he did not favor American complicity in the overthrow of Diem. (He acknowledges, however, that he joined in the criticism of Diem that encouraged the authors of the coup.)

Until Diem fell, as Taylor points out, it was possible to believe, and with good reason in the evidence, that South Vietnamese and American military efforts to suppress Viet Cong insurgency were making progress and that if South Vietnam retained reasonable political stability these efforts would substantially defeat the insurrection. To be sure, though General Taylor does *not* point it out, there is a considerable possibility that, had Diem lived, he might have worked out his own kind of accommodation with Ho Chi Minh independently of the Americans; but worse things than that could have happened in Vietnam—and did. Yet as Taylor does point out repeatedly and rightly, the fall of Diem precluded for a long time whatever chances of political stability South Vietnam had. In the military field, the event so encouraged the Viet Cong to initiate a major bid for victory, and gave them so many opportunities

[†] Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1972, \$10.00), 434 pages.

to exploit, that it reversed our hopeful progress, cast South Vietnam upon the brink of military defeat, and led to President Johnson's decision to begin a large-scale American military intervention. That intervention rescued South Vietnam for the time being but propelled the United States itself toward many unhappy consequences. Still worse, American complicity in the fall and assassination of Diem linked the United States to the fate of South Vietnam in the most unfortunate possible way: a partnership of shared guilt. "By our complicity," says General Taylor, "we Americans were responsible to some degree for the plight in which the South Vietnamese found themselves. That thought gave pause to any consideration of abandoning them." American complicity in the fall and assassination of Diem sealed the United States presence in South Vietnam. General Taylor calls the autumn of 1963 "The Autumn of Disaster"—and not only because of the assassination of President Kennedy.

When Taylor visited Diem just prior to that autumn of disaster, in the last week of September, he favored establishing specific political, economic, and military goals to put before the South Vietnamese as targets to be gained. He also contemplated an end to the American involvement in Vietnam if reasonable progress toward the goals were not achieved: "... warning to Diem that, if the programs lagged from his failure to perform, we Americans would not feel obliged to stay in Vietnam indefinitely and wait for him to catch up after doing our part." At that time Taylor believed that "we should take the end of 1965 as the target date for the termination of the military part of the American task. If a further deterioration of the political situation should occur to invalidate the target date, we would have to review our attitude toward Diem's government and our national interests in Southeast Asia." But American complicity in the coup that overthrew and killed Diem bound the United States to South Vietnam in a way Taylor had not foreseen when he thus contemplated terminating

the American commitment: the United States was henceforth ethically obliged to help the South Vietnamese out of a predicament to which the American government had greatly contributed. "... there is no question," says General Taylor, "but that President Kennedy and all of us who advised him bore a heavy responsibility for these happenings [i.e., the coup and by implication its consequences] by having encouraged the perpetrators through the public display of our disapproval of Diem and his brother."

Persuasive as his argument for the pivotal nature of Diem's fall is, however, Taylor's discussion of his proposal to set a terminal date for American military involvement in Vietnam if Diem failed to make satisfactory progress casts a shadow of ambiguity over his many assertions in the book that the defense of South Vietnam was indeed vital to the national interests of the United States. Through such assertions as well as through reference to American complicity in the fall of Diem, Taylor seeks to justify our long involvement beyond the terminal date he contemplated, the end of 1965. But why, if South Vietnam was so vital to us, could Taylor at one time consider an early termination of our military involvement?

Similarly, Taylor twice refers with implied approval to Kennedy administration policy statements that he interprets as reaffirming the Truman Doctrine. He writes, for example, of a statement of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to a Congressional subcommittee on 31 July 1961: "This was strong language which sounded very much like a restatement of the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and a renewed resolve to resist Communist aggression anywhere any time." The Truman Doctrine of 1947 did promise to resist Communist aggression anywhere any time—in Truman's language, "to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." But was it really wise to offer this blanket promise of American help irrespective of the degree to which the specific interests of

the United States were involved in any given situation? Does General Taylor, in fact, believe that the United States ought "to resist Communist aggression anywhere any time"? Is such an affirmation consistent with his 1963 idea of withdrawing the United States from Vietnam if the South Vietnamese government itself failed to get moving? Is such an affirmation consistent with Taylor's statement late in his book, when he is seeking to draw lessons from Vietnam in regard to future commitments of American military force, that "the choice of the cause is of the utmost importance in avoiding future discomfitures of the Vietnam kind. To gain initial popular support, the issue must offer a clear promise of important national gain at tolerable costs and thus qualify as a valid national interest"? Has not General Taylor in this latter statement defined the proper grounds on which the United States ought to take up arms but the criteria which South Vietnam did not meet: to resist Communist aggression not "anywhere any time" but only when the situation offers important national gain *for the United States* and at tolerable costs?

In the same concluding section, General Taylor expresses well-founded concern about what the Vietnam experience will prove to have done to American ability to utilize limited war, when limited war is likely to remain the only appropriate instrument of American policy in various circumstances. The Korean and Vietnamese experiences alike, Taylor rightly emphasizes, show that it is doubtful that limited war can command enough support among the American public to continue as a usable tool. ". . . any President wishing to exploit military force as an instrument of policy [is] impaled on the three-horned dilemma: risking World War III if he uses military power decisively, another Vietnam if he uses it timidly, or the attrition of our world-wide interests if he relies only upon nonmilitary forms of power." The dilemma may be even worse than Taylor thinks, for he believes that we could have succeeded long since in Vietnam if we had used our military

power decisively rather than employing strategic gradualism. Perhaps so, but this belief may not take adequate notice of the fact that, as Taylor remarks elsewhere, the North Vietnamese leaders have proven to be "incredibly tough" and willing to stand up under a vast amount of punishment. However that may be, General Taylor is surely right to worry about the effect of Vietnam on our ability to employ the option of limited war and on the general credibility of our military power as an instrument of deterrence and of national policy.

If there is a way out of the dilemma of which Taylor speaks, one step toward finding that way must be to clarify, more than Taylor does, our understanding of the conditions under which we ought to employ military force. Despite the usual precision of the General's judgments and his prose, the shadow of ambiguity persists throughout this book, both about whether we should have persisted as long as we have in Vietnam and about when we ought to use the instrument of limited war. My own judgment is that we ought to employ active military force not to resist Communist aggression anywhere any time but only when the probable costs of action are proportionate to the dimensions of the American national interest at stake. American actions in Southeast Asia since 1961 have imposed costs too disproportionate to any American interests at issue there. Furthermore, while recognizing with General Taylor the danger of attrition to our worldwide interests if we rely only upon nonmilitary forms of power, I would go beyond the lessons he draws from both Korea and Vietnam to emphasize that, while we should be ready to fight when our interests demand it, the chief service of our armed forces should be to obviate the necessity of fighting. I would emphasize that we would have been better off if we had found ways not to fight the Korean and Vietnam wars more successfully but to prevent them from occurring at all. I would give more weight than General Taylor does to the dictum of Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie in his admirable little book

on military strategy: "War for a nonaggressor nation is actually a nearly complete collapse of policy."²

General Taylor's memoir is worth a thoughtful reading. It does not deserve the churlish review that Neil Sheehan gave it in the *New York Times Book Review*, in which, using

barely euphemistic terms, Sheehan accused Taylor of having been shown up by the Pentagon papers as mendacious.³ But in trying to draw lessons from Vietnam, even Taylor, in his pessimistic summary, misses the full grimness of those lessons.

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Notes

1. Russell F. Weigley, "What Was Past Was Prologue," *Air University Review*, XXII, 6 (September-October 1971), 69-76, a review of Henry F. Graff's *The Tuesday Cabinet: Deliberation and Decision on Peace and War under Lyn-*

don B. Johnson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

2. J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967), p. 80.

3. *New York Times Book Review*, April 9, 1972, p. 3.

A QUARTER CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION: SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1944-1969

DR. KENNETH R. WHITING

APPARENTLY the flood of books about China is not about to ebb, nor is the quality any less checkered as the years go by. These works vary from serious studies to pot-boilers aimed at grabbing off a segment of what appears to be an insatiable market. A yellow dustjacket with China in large red letters seems to be the answer to a publisher's prayers. Unfortunately, one of the characteristics of most American writing about China is the tendency to account for "the loss of China"—as if we ever had it—as the work of one or more villains, sometimes Chinese, sometimes American, and sometimes both. These villains stubbornly refused to comply with a simplistic solution so obvious to the author of the work explaining

our "loss of China." During the McCarthy period, the villains were the U.S. State Department officials, in both Washington and Chungking, allegedly working hand in glove with the Chinese Communists. Later Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang "clique" were the bad guys who stubbornly refused to carry out needed reforms and thus allowed Mao and his gang to take over almost by default. Every Secretary of State from George Marshall to Dean Rusk has received a share of the obloquy so generously dished out in recent years. On the other side, Mao Tse-tung is either the Great Helmsman guiding the Chinese Revolution toward Utopia or a psychopathic monster surpassing even Stalin—after all, Mao had more

people to pick on than did Stalin.

The two books † herein reviewed are guilty of the tendency to "villainize" to some degree. Caldwell's book focuses on two main villains, Chiang Kai-shek and the head of his secret military police, Tai Li. The late Professor Dulles's book is more restrained, but John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk are portrayed as the heavies in the Sino-American drama between 1953 and 1968. The two books are vastly different: Caldwell's is a personal record of his experiences with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in China in the 1944-45 period while Dulles's book, as its title indicates, is an attempt to describe American policy toward China between 1949 and 1969. The first is journalistic in style, the latter a scholarly work.

Caldwell would seem to have impeccable credentials as a China watcher since he was born in Foochow and educated through secondary school in China. He was an enthusiastic supporter of Chiang Kai-shek when he was sent to China in 1944 but was rapidly disillusioned during his two years with the Nationalists. He vividly describes the totalitarian aspects of Chiang's Kuomintang regime, especially the Gestapo-like methods of Tai Li and the Secret Military Police, which he claims drove the liberals into the arms of the Communists. His account of Tai Li's Happy Valley, the headquarters where Li concocted his skulduggery, allegedly with the connivance of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO), headed by a malevolent U.S. Naval captain named Miles, sounds like a Dr. Fu Manchu thriller by Sax Rohmer. Caldwell found himself playing a whole series of roles: he was working for the OSS, involved with Tai Li's outfit, and, through a mysterious Mr. Chen, was in cahoots with some leaders of the Chinese secret societies who were trying to create a "Third Force," a

liberal leadership aspiring to occupy a middle ground between Chiang on the right and Mao on the left.

Caldwell's constant complaint is the lack of realization on the part of Washington and its man in Chungking, General Pat Hurley, that the only salvation for China was firm American support for a liberal third force. This is the same will-o'-the-wisp that eluded General George C. Marshall during his mission to China in 1945 and 1946. As John K. Fairbank points out in the following passage from his Introduction to Dulles's book, this was indeed an *ignis fatuus*:

The American analysis of the late 1940's that China needed reform which Chiang Kai-shek refused to provide is now yielding to the recognition that the Chinese revolution had accumulated an urgency and inevitability that probably no reform program could have satisfied. In a way, these recent studies of the deep-seated malaise in Chinese society, of the necessity for mass mobilization and the participation of the farming population in political life, all lend credence to Chiang Kai-shek's claim that reform would only feed the fire of rebellion. It seems more plain that he represented an old order that could not be remade with the same actors still on the scene; the reforms urged by sundry Americans could not perpetuate his power. It was far too late for reform to stave off revolution, and General Marshall's decision in 1946 to disengage from the Chinese mainland was the only feasible one. (p. viii)

The only course open to Chinese liberals in the situation prevailing at the end of the war was to fall in step with either Mao or Chiang, or opt out entirely.

The best parts of Caldwell's book are Chapter 9, in which he describes two journeys from Kunming to Sian, some 1500 miles through Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechwan, and Shensi, and Chapter 10, in which he gives a vivid picture of wartime Sian. He is obviously in love with

† Oliver J. Caldwell, *A Secret War: Americans in China, 1944-1945* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972, \$5.95), 218 pages.

Foster Rhea Dulles, *American Policy toward Communist China: The Historical Record, 1949-1969* (New York: Crowell, 1972, \$7.95), 173 pages.

the scenic beauty of west China and with its peoples, both Han and non-Han. Furthermore, it provides an artistic device through which he points up the contrast between the simple Chinese peasant, tilling his plot in the pure mountain environment, and the fetid political atmosphere of wartime Chungking. If one is not too finicky about the lack of scholarly tone, Caldwell's book makes for good light reading and does give some flavor of the weird political situation in China at the close of World War II.

FOSTER RHEA DULLES's study is a serious attempt to portray the evolution of American policy toward Communist China from 1949 to 1969. There is little, if anything, new in Professor Dulles's account, but it does get the story into a concise format, only 173 pages. It is the sad tale of a series of lost opportunities for a better understanding between Washington and Peking, at least as told by Dulles. The real tragedy seems to be that whenever one side hinted at *détente*, the other side was in a hostile phase; the urges toward *détente* never seemed to coincide. Furthermore, underlying the American policy in Asia was the assumption that the People's Republic of China (PRC) was an aggressive Communist nation determined to expand into Southeast Asia, an assumption that took as axiomatic that the Chinese were instruments of overall Kremlin strategy. American policy-makers were altogether too slow in realizing that Chinese nationalism was the primary driving force in Peking's policies and that Mao and his associates were never merely a Soviet instrument. With the hindsight that makes historians and Sunday-morning quarterbacks omniscient, Dulles assumes that American policy-makers should have been able to distinguish between Peking's rhetoric and its serious intentions. This was asking a lot of the statesmen in Washington who were confronting either Chinese troops in Korea or Chinese-assisted Communists in Indochina.

As the story moves through the 1950s and 1960s, each incoming U.S. administration inherited a messy set of problems from its predecessor. The Roosevelt attempt to make Nationalist China a great power was a shambles when bequeathed to Truman. Truman tried to play a neutral role from the closing years of the Chinese civil war, but the Chinese intervention in Korea made the backing of Chiang's regime in Taiwan too tempting a gambit to be resisted. Furthermore, Peking's backing of the Ho Chi Minh insurgency in Vietnam led the United States to support the French. The incoming Eisenhower regime inherited a triple confrontation with the PRC—Korea, Indochina, and Taiwan. The new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, a cousin of our author, was less a statesman than a fervent moral crusader against Communism, and Foster Rhea does not let his kinsman off lightly. Secretary Dulles's refusal to be civil to Chou En-lai at the Geneva Conference in 1954, his rejection of Chou's offer to negotiate made at Bandung in 1955, and his sabotaging of a reciprocal exchange of newsmen between China and the United States in 1956—all are regarded as lost opportunities to better relations with Peking. Dulles's bolstering of the American position in Asia through a series of treaties, especially the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan and the creation of SEATO, could not but cause alarm in Peking. Only Eisenhower's adamant refusal to engage American troops on the mainland of Asia kept Dulles from getting the U.S. even more deeply committed in Vietnam. When the Kennedy administration came in, the U.S. commitment to the Diem regime in South Vietnam was one of its inheritances. It also inherited a messy situation in Laos.

During all this period, for domestic reasons no administration dared to move very far or very fast in easing relations with Peking. The Truman-Acheson team was faced with the hysterical McCarthy accusations of not only being soft on Communism but even of being treasonable. The McCarthy spirit carried over into the

Eisenhower period. Any suggestion that the PRC be allowed into the United Nations infuriated the China lobby and the China bloc in Congress. Even Kennedy had to instruct Adlai Stevenson to resist the admission of the PRC; he felt that it was too early to get the American public to endorse such a move.

Johnson, on taking office, found that during the Kennedy years the military mission in South Vietnam had been increased from 800 to 16,000 men. Then came the escalation with its tragic consequences for President Johnson. This was the situation bequeathed to Nixon when he became President in 1969. Throughout the Kennedy and Johnson years, Professor Dulles's main target is Dean Rusk, whom he portrays as an anachronism of the early cold war days, a man obsessed by the danger of Communist expansion, the "Cold Warrior" incarnate.

To a certain extent, Professor Dulles seems to be indulging in a mild form of demonology, with the demons located mainly in the executive branch of the American government. That the presidents and secretaries of state during those twenty years reflected American opinion is played down. The Formosan Resolution of January 1955, which gave President Eisenhower an open-ended grant of authority in the defense of Taiwan, and the Tonkin Bay Resolution, which gave President Johnson similar powers in Indochina—both passed Congress with scarcely a dissenting vote. Only when the casualty lists mounted precipitously did the public sour on the war.

On the other hand, the picture with respect to Chinese policies or Hanoi's strategy is blurred. Mao, Chou, Lin Piao, and Ho Chi Minh are vague figures in the background. Professor Dulles has little to say about the constant barrage of threats from Peking, threats that turned out to be somewhat hollow in retrospect but were alarming at the time they were made. Unfortunately, we do not know what Peking's real intentions were during many of the crises, since the Bamboo Curtain is very opaque indeed. Usually, we know why an American

leader did what he did, but not why the opponent reacted as he did—we can only surmise. Thus the study of American-Chinese relations tends to be one-dimensional and exceedingly frustrating.

These presidents and their secretaries of state had all seen Hitler's rhetoric become action, the word become deed. Why shouldn't they take Mao's rhetoric seriously? Furthermore, they had witnessed the enormous expansion of Communism in the postwar years, an expansion from a single country, the Soviet Union, to fourteen countries by 1961, not even counting the gobbling up of the three Baltic states. The number of people under Communist control had gone from fewer than 200 million in 1944 to 1200 million by the early 1960s, a sixfold increase. Little wonder that administration after administration in Washington felt there was more than just rhetoric emanating from Peking, Moscow, and Hanoi.

Professor Dulles, who died in September 1970, lived long enough to be puzzled about Nixon. Throughout his book, only Nixon is depicted as a more stalwart cold warrior than Dean Rusk. But the new policy enunciated at Guam, plus other overtures made to Peking in 1969 and 1970, seemed to indicate a new approach to the PRC. As Dulles put it: ". . . these steps were significant: they had broken through the patterns of the past." (p. 243)

Why has that epitome of cold warriorhood, Richard Nixon, emerged as the first President of the United States to visit both Peking and Moscow? With no intention of derogating the brilliance of the Nixon performance, nevertheless he is operating in a different domestic and international milieu than his predecessors. The leadership in Peking, as it entered the 1970s, found itself in an almost untenable position. Its now hostile neighbor to the north and west along a 6000-mile border, the Soviet Union, had won great influence in India, while China's ally, Pakistan, had just been torn asunder. Therefore, most of China's land frontiers adjoined hostile neighbors. In Southeast Asia and

along China's coast loomed the United States and its allies, a network of alliances stretching from South Korea to Thailand. And China's traditional enemy, Japan, had become the world's third-largest economic power, power that could be translated into military power in Peking's opinion. In short, the leaders of the PRC were in a hostile relationship with the two superpowers and with two potentially dangerous neighbors, India and Japan. Something drastic had to be done to get out of such an absurd impasse. The Peking leadership, noting that the United States was showing every intention of lessening its overcommitment in Asia while the Soviet Union was expanding its commitments in South Asia and showing an increasing interest in completing its encirclement of China, saw the American threat as the lesser of the two. Ergo, Peking's favorable response to the Nixon overtures and the summit of 1972.

The point to be made, a point that seems to have eluded Professor Dulles in his analysis of the Sino-American relationship over two decades, is that presidents and secretaries of state as well as Communist policy-makers are to a large extent the victims of their domestic and foreign environments. An Acheson could not have journeyed to Peking to drink toasts with

the Communists in the early 1950s without being stoned by an irate public on his return. A China only mildly angry at Russia and still in a state of peaceful coexistence with India was proof against any blandishments by Dulles, even if such a thought had crossed the mind of that crusader. But a China that had experienced two armed conflicts with India and was still shaken by its armed clash with the Russians on the Ussuri in March 1969 was open to Nixon blandishments. Thus, at least to some extent, the "villains" of Professor Dulles and Mr. Caldwell could better be called the victims of the particular circumstances extant during their tenure of office.

I do not intend this lengthy analysis of Professor Dulles's book to disparage the work; rather, I seek to point up the fact that it tends to elicit thought and to provoke argument, both indicators of a good book. In less than 200 pages he has skillfully interwoven most of the salient facts pertinent to his topic and done it without sacrificing readability. Anyone desiring a compact account of American vicissitudes vis-à-vis the People's Republic of China over the last two decades could do no better than read Professor Dulles's book.

Air University Institute for Professional Development

THE CONTINUING SEARCH FOR A MILITARY IMAGE

DR. GEORGE W. COLLINS

IN 1957, when he was Commander of the Tactical Air Command, General Otto P. Weyland wrote: "I don't think any unbiased Air Force officer visualizes B-52's finding and dropping weapons on a small guerrilla troop

concentration in the jungles of Indo-China—or some other area of concern in the local war problem. I not only think it illogical, but feel that it would be a pure mal-employment of such an expensive force when we can do the

job better and more economically with tactical air forces." Obviously the pattern of warfare and the use of strategic and tactical weapon systems in Southeast Asia have not developed as General Weyland would have predicted. Forces of both the Air Force and Navy that were designed for tactical operations have carried the burden of the "strategic" air war in North Vietnam, while the B-52 Stratofortress has been used in a tactical role, primarily south of the 17th parallel.¹ But the long-endured war not only affected concepts of military operations, it also intensified apprehension as to the pervasive weight of the totality of military affairs upon America and, in the General John D. Lavelle incident, led to an inquiry to determine whether the First Commandment of American military policy (the principle of civilian control) had been violated.

This review deals with two recent books which, while quite different in format and scope, are both concerned with the role of the military in modern America. The first, by Robert Frank Futrell, with a look from the inside of one of the nation's military services, is a lengthy examination of basic Air Force conceptual thought. The other is a collection of readings appraising the impact of the military upon society and which, moreover, conveys a contemporary view of the military image. †

For many years a faculty research scholar and historian at Air University, Dr. Futrell is well known for his history of the air war in Korea.² For this present work he has mastered a prodigious amount of primary material and has included more than a hundred pages of documentation from the writings and speeches of major military and civilian air power leaders, as well as their testimony before Congressional committees and other forums. The book has

been standing in the wings for more than a few years, apparently awaiting security clearance.

While Futrell has not established any organizational subdivisions, the contents inherently fit into three main sections: first, an account of the history of ideas and institutions within Army aviation from its beginnings in 1907 through the Second World War; then, discussion of the period from 1945 to 1957, when basic postwar policy was formulated and the Soviet nuclear missile threat emerged; and, finally, a review of the developments from the late fifties to 1964, when first the "New Look" and then "flexible response" became American military policy. The three terms, "ideas, concepts, doctrine," Futrell defines as representing the evolutionary process from the original thought to its ultimate implementation as operational reality. About three-fourths of the material is concerned with developments since 1945. Among the old interservice rivalries discussed are the B-36 quarrel with the Navy, the arguments over a 70-group Air Force, as well as basic disagreements over missions, money, and unification. In addition, there is considerable material on the Air Force attitude regarding the "New Frontier" policy of nuclear stalemate and flexible response.

The role of Air University, along with various organizations under its command charged with the development of doctrine, looms large in these pages. Given the responsibility for formulating air doctrine in 1946, Air University found it to be a difficult task, and it was not until the mid-fifties that the first round of Air Force manuals codifying doctrine appeared. However, the concurrent joint efforts of the armed services to coordinate and frame an effective, unified doctrine failed. Even more unfortunate, Futrell maintains, was the fact

† Robert Frank Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964* (2 vols., Air University, Ala.: Aerospace Studies Institute, 1971).

Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr., editors, *The Military and American Society: Essays and Readings* (New York: The Free Press, 1972, \$10.00), 322 pages.

that, in the development of Air Force thought, stagnation set in during the fifties—and at a time when new problems of missiles and aerospace warfare had to be faced. He quotes former Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert to indicate how “parochial” Air Force thinking had become. One can conjecture that the need to counter the increasing criticism of the Eisenhower-Dulles “New Look” policy of massive deterrence may have contributed to the conservatism of Air Force thought. That criticism came from both within and outside military circles; from Army Generals Maxwell D. Taylor, Matthew B. Ridgway, and James M. Gavin, who argued for more balanced forces and were joined by influential intellectuals such as George F. Kennan and Bernard Brodie, who, dreading to risk the unleashing of thermonuclear holocaust, also supported a larger role for conventional military forces. The introduction of the Kennedy administration in 1961 made the formulation of air doctrine no easier, as the critics of massive deterrence received a sympathetic hearing. Rejecting the favored Air Force strategy of counterforce as “spasm war,” President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara instituted a policy of strategic stalemate and flexible response, stressing the capability of coping with both nuclear and conventional warfare. Meanwhile, Futrell observes, the Air Staff decided late in 1961 to hold back the revision of doctrine until the New Frontier military strategy had matured.

Ultimately, new vigor was found, and a second round of doctrinal study was undertaken in 1963–64. While Futrell notes that the Air Force never discovered a counterpart to the Navy’s Mahan (to formulate basic, lasting air doctrine), he has high praise for Air Force Manual 1–1, *United States Air Force Basic Doctrine*. Drafted under the supervision of Major General Jerry D. Page, that 1964 manual is commended for its recognition that “basic doctrine evolves through the continuing analysis and testing of military operations in the light of national objectives and the changing military

environment.” According to Futrell, that concept of continued evolution of doctrine, rather than static doctrine, provided the Air Force with an outlook suited not only to the needs of massive thermonuclear deterrence but also to lower levels of conflict.

The effort to convert ideas and concepts into doctrine and organization necessarily required theoretical projection of advanced weapon systems. The Air Force here tended to follow the conservative view that “a bird in the hand, etc.,” and as a result intercontinental missiles were afforded a low priority; nor were nuclear weapons evaluated highly at first as they were few in number and not expected to be decisive. When Secretary McNamara threw his support behind an extensive missile program rather than the B-70, Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White warned that to rely primarily on missiles, instead of a balanced strategic force of missiles and manned bombers, would breed a disastrous Maginot Line psychology. But that was a losing battle, and the obsolescence of the B-52s increased while no replacement was programmed.

Among the more interesting doctrinal matters which Futrell presents is the question of the desirability of separate strategic tactical air forces. The issue had arisen during World War II when Brigadier Generals Orvil A. Anderson and Robert C. Candee both protested such arbitrary division of air power—which Candee condemned as mistakenly copied from the British. The same question emerged again in the 1950s when Major General John De F. Barker, Deputy Commander of Air University, spoke out against separate air arms, and former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter and General Curtis E. LeMay independently proposed the consolidation of SAC and TAC. The legitimacy of the question is evident, for in every major war in which America has engaged since and including World War I, strategic bombardment aircraft have been used in tactical roles. Futrell cites a 1951 Air Staff paper stating that the designations “strategic” and

"tactical" air forces "were arbitrarily chosen" and were not intended to be rigidly construed.

In assessing this book, one is reminded of the comment of Michael Howard, the eminent British military historian, who said that the central problem for mankind in this century, and one which the military historian must study, is this: "Under what circumstances can armed force be used, in the only way in which it can be legitimate to use it, to ensure a lasting and stable peace?"³ For that is the problem that Futrell has addressed in narrating the history of air power thought within the United States Air Force. He has most clearly stated the convictions of many air leaders that without adequate American air power the probabilities of a lasting and stable peace are very limited. Moreover, the conceptual thinking within air power circles and the Air Force's efforts to establish an organizational framework in which to foster such thinking are described here with a thoroughness that will mark this book as an invaluable research tool for every student of air power.

There are some disappointments, nonetheless. In his chapters dealing with the pre-World War II years, Futrell has not appreciably enlarged upon the work of Thomas H. Greer,⁴ and he therefore could have more briefly summarized that period. In addition, Futrell has failed to provide any insight into the character and background of the various air leaders. Admittedly this is a study of ideas; however, intellectual history cannot ignore the human elements. Snippets of those leaders' ideas, with no insight as to how their professional assignments and ambitions may have nurtured them, are insufficient. One is repeatedly struck, for example, by how the arguments of LeMay, Cannon, Schriever, Weyland, and others so often appear to be merely expressive of their dedication to the particular arm of air power they happened to command. This is not a question of their sincerity, but it surely points to the need for more biographical and professional data on the individual leaders than Futrell has

provided, including not only the relatively well-known commanders but also such conceptual thinkers as Jerry D. Page, Noel F. Parrish, and Richard P. Klocko.

Finally, it is regrettable that Aerospace Studies Institute could not have provided a better printing format. Earlier Air University publications, Greer's for example, were not set in typescript and are easier to read. Furthermore, the Greer volume was indexed—a deplorable omission in Futrell's work, in which so many individuals, organizations, and ideas are discussed that even to track down an individual's full name or position is quite time consuming. And whoever decided to place all the footnotes at the back of the second volume made a serious blunder. Each volume is large and awkward to handle, and to cope with both at once in an attempt to follow the documentation is most annoying. One hopes that future reprinting will correct these as well as the many typographical errors.

THE BOOK of readings edited by Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr., differs considerably from Futrell's. The essays deal primarily with post-1945 developments within the American military and, more generally, with how military demands and policies have affected American society.⁵ Both editors are established scholars of military affairs. In the last ten years Professor Ambrose has published a number of books on American military history, and Barber, now teaching at the Naval War College, has written for the *Naval War College Review*. In the book under consideration here, the editors, besides presenting essays of their own, have selected a well-chosen variety of material by governmental officers, journalists, and scholars on topics ranging from a critique of the military-industrial complex to the relationship of the military to foreign policy, race relations, domestic order, and even to ecology. It is surprising to learn that virtually half of the adult males in the United States

have had some military service. That statistic alone lends credence to the thesis of the extensive societal impact of the military. Except for the essays by the editors, almost all the readings have been published previously. Most of them are of recent date; only three predate 1964, the selection from President Dwight D. Eisenhower and those by Samuel P. Huntington and Jack Raymond.

As might be expected, several of the contributors are dismayed about the concentration of military authority. Mr. Raymond, of the *New York Times*, questions those legislative changes since 1947 that greatly augmented the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff while John Kenneth Galbraith's apprehensions about the military-industrial complex exceed those of Eisenhower. Nevertheless Ambrose, himself a challenging critic of many aspects of militarism, concludes that, although the military is gigantic, it has not swallowed the American society and "does not dominate our lives, establish values, or dictate our foreign and domestic policies." Furthermore, as Lawrence B. Tatum observes in an article included in the book, the number of military men appointed to key non-military positions within the government has declined in the past twenty years. He maintains that the high incidence of their employment immediately after the Second World War was primarily due to the shortage of civilian talent available at that time. Contrarily, today some people are fearful that the ascendancy of civilian leadership in military affairs is dangerous,⁶ although, as Tatum reminds us, that has been the American tradition.⁷

For those individuals interested in current sociological tensions in America, there are pertinent selections by Professors Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., and by both the editors, on socialization and race relations. The writers generally agree that the military has provided individuals of "lower class" backgrounds with a sense of belonging and with opportunities for better living, which they of-

ten lacked in civilian life. Ambrose, differing with Harry S. Truman's interpretation of how, as President, he had introduced integration in the military services, credits black leaders with having pressured the administration to take action.⁸ Each of these readings is incisive and very helpful to an understanding of the broader interrelations between the military and other aspects of American society.

Ambrose and Barber have included only a few selections dealing with military planning and operations. In one of these, I. F. Stone, a respected radical journalist, chastizes both President Nixon and the military services for their continued support for strategic bombers, a policy that Stone denounces as an "expensive luxury," since he doubts the bombers' penetration ability. Nevertheless, this argument continues. Time and again USAF has reiterated its need for a supersonic heavy bomber and last year was supported vigorously by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, who testified in the Senate hearings regarding the SALT agreement that he would not recommend acceptance of that arms limitation unless further funds were provided for the B-1 bomber and Trident submarine development. Yet, although such development funds were included in the fiscal 1973 DOD budget, little bomber production is yet seen.

The variety of the selections in this book is such that most readers will find some articles more noteworthy than others. Jack Raymond's comments on former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's interest in exercising operational control will appeal to those who are attracted to questions of the command of American military forces. Another thoughtful article is Martin Blumenson's "On the Function of the Military in Civil Disorders," which presents another nuance in the long controversy regarding the respective merits of regular and militia forces. Using the 1967 Detroit riots as an example, Blumenson argues that regular soldiers have demonstrated a far greater ability to act successfully and with restraint than has the National Guard.

In general, while the editors are to be complimented on assembling these selections, they would have assisted their readers more had they included a preface or introduction that stated their intentions; in that respect the title is not a sufficient guide. And parallel to the typographical shoddiness of Futrell's book is the editorial laxity of Ambrose and Barber. The citations regarding previous publication of the selections included are incomplete and inconsistent, sometimes lacking the volume number, date, and pagination from the journal where the articles were originally published. Stylistic changes were made unnecessarily and not indicated in the articles by Raymond and Tatum, and in the latter the changes misrepresent the author's intended meaning.

While the readings included in Ambrose-Barber are provocative and merit attention, the stature of this work obviously is not on the same plane with Futrell's original study. Dr. Futrell's book is a major contribution to the history of military thought, and no one dealing with the intellectual context of air power development, or even more generally with the problems of war and peace in the twentieth century, can afford to overlook it. Within the USAF, it should be studied at the highest levels in what one hopes is a continuous effort to provide individual and organizational priority for the formulation of ideas, concepts, and doctrine.

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Notes

1. For an account of the tactical use of the B-52, see William H. Greenhalgh, Jr., "AOK Airpower over Khe Sanh," *Aerospace Historian*, 19 (March 1972), 2-9.
2. Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1961).
3. Michael Howard, "Strategy and Policy in Twentieth-Century Warfare," *The Harmon Lectures in Military History*, no. 9 (U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, 1967), p. 12.
4. Thomas H. Greer, *The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941* (Air University, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, 1955).
5. These topics currently are receiving much and proper attention. The

theme of the USAF Academy Fifth Military History Symposium held on 5-6 October 1972 was "The Military and Society." As Professor Louis Morton mused in the wrap-up session of that conference, there is an inconsistency in treating the military as something apart from society.

6. See Herman S. Wolk, "Antimilitarism in America," *Air University Review*, XXIII, 4 (May-June 1972), 23.
7. An excellent article refuting the likelihood of dominant militarism in America is Colonel Richard F. Rosser, USAF, "Civil-Military Relations in the 1980s," *Military Review*, LII (March 1972), 18-31.
8. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. II, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), 182-83.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY— THE ENDS AND THE MEANS

COLONEL HAROLD L. HITCHENS

DEFENDERS of American support for South Vietnam over the past decade have tended to take comfort in recalling previous instances when Administration foreign policy led to strong domestic repercussions. Korea is the most recent example; our military campaign there—once the initial Communist invasion from the North had been halted—evoked the typical American disillusionment with a policy that does not result in immediate, tangible success. A century earlier there was great opposition in the North to the Mexican

War, and modern dissenters are fond of calling up the figure of the tall young Congressman from Illinois, Abraham Lincoln, as he paced up and down the aisle in the House, speaking out against the war and President Polk's policies. Even farther back, the War of 1812—and the policies of Jefferson and Madison which helped bring it on—sharply divided the country. New England sailors and merchants, for whom the war was supposedly being fought, denounced it bitterly. Threats of secession and nullification were rife, and Daniel Webster, later to become

the great champion of the Union, warned in 1814 that his state would not obey the conscription laws.

Yet all these precedents of opposition to American war policies do not account for the present torrent of shrill and violent criticism of the Vietnam war nor of American foreign policy in general. There is an element of our populace which, as author Philip Quigg puts it, ". . . believes that the United States is inherently aggressive, unprincipled and either incompetent or unsuited to play any responsible role in the world." †

Vietnam is, for a number of reasons, the focus of the uneasiness of some Americans over our foreign policy, but there are other underlying causes. There is the residual isolationism that survives from the nineteenth century, when Americans turned their backs on the world and for a century bent their energies to spreading over a continent. Then there was America's deep involvement in the two World Wars and in the post-World War II period. Now the pendulum has swung back. There is the coming of age, vocally, of the first generation of Americans to be brought up on television, where, in the passage of an hour or half hour, problems are posed and neatly resolved. (It takes time to realize that the problems of the real world are not so simply settled.) And finally, there is the deep, subjective dissatisfaction with our society felt by many intellectuals and expressed through the media they largely dominate. Often intelligent and articulate, they convey the impression that in the "right" kind of society they would be the ones guiding policy and reaping the material rewards that now go to others. It follows that the policies of an Administration to which they do not belong are, by definition, misguided and ruinous.

Philip Quigg, who for fifteen years was managing editor of *Foreign Affairs*, notes how we have wavered between isolationism and respon-

sibility toward the rest of the world, but he eschews discussion of most underlying factors in the current foreign policy controversy. Instead, he examines the bases for a series of current, commonly held denigrations of U.S. policy. Are we arrogant and messianic? Not so, says Quigg. We are known abroad as self-critics, and we have been far more restrained and pragmatic than many smaller nations.

Are we obsessively anti-Communist? Quigg, writing before the recent Strategic Arms Limitation agreements, finds that while we have had real bases for resisting Communism, our policies have been relatively restrained. Furthermore, he says, "Our fear of communism has been as nothing compared to our antagonists' fear of freedom."

A common radical-elite criticism of American foreign policy is that we oppose revolution and support "rightists." Quigg approaches this subject by raising a question: "Is revolution really a shortcut to a more just society?" He thinks not, and he adds a consideration that revolutionaries are inclined to ignore—the massive bloodshed that accompanies revolutions: "For Americans to go about indiscriminately promoting revolutions is trifling with human life on a very large scale." This, of course, is hardly a deterrent to American intellectuals, and Quigg quotes Irving Kristol's observation that ". . . American foreign policy . . . must work within a climate of opinion that finds the idea of a *gradual* evolution of traditional societies thoroughly uninteresting—which, indeed, has an instinctive detestation of all traditional societies as being inherently unjust . . ."

Some of our intellectuals' enchantment with revolutionary techniques arises from a misunderstanding of our own Revolution in the eighteenth century. Popular rhetoric to the contrary, the American Revolution does not constitute an example for poor, backward nations of today. Our Revolution had a conserva-

† Philip W. Quigg, *America the Dutiful: An Assessment of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971, \$6.95), 223 pages.

tive, legalistic character; it aimed only at political separation from Britain, because the mother country was thought to have altered the structure of the Empire as Americans had known it. As historian Daniel Boorstin has said, "The most obvious peculiarity of our American Revolution is that, in the modern European sense of the word, it was hardly a revolution at all." The analogy to modern revolutions has even less application when we consider that in 1776 the United States was no poor country like most of the new nations of Asia and Africa. In 1776 the United States had the third-highest gross national product in the world, exceeded only by Britain and France, and per capita income was the highest in the world.

Quigg's book also looks at instances of our supposed support of rightist dictatorships. The truth is, he says, that our policies have complex causes and are not based on any simplistic notion that "radical is risky and conservative is safe."

In the remainder of his book, Quigg goes into other common assertions about recent American foreign policy. On our supposed overcommitment and propensity to intervene in other nations' affairs, Quigg recalls that while there were 164 outbreaks of significant violence in the world between 1958 and 1966 the United States had been involved in only seven. Quigg's analysis includes a long discussion of each instance. If we assume that the United States has any national interests at all—however difficult to define—then we have to assume that such interests impose obligations, even though the radical critics call this self-righteous and hypocritical. Many of these critics assert that our national interest has the real aim of establishing American economic domination of the world; yet, as Quigg says, "most nations of the Third World have nothing that is essential to us," and our trade and investment go mostly to the developed nations (Europe, Canada, etc.). Furthermore, from the standpoint of political and military intervention, our greatest "sin," Vietnam, is taking place in Asia; yet, as Quigg

points out, "almost without exception the non-Communist countries of Asia have urged the United States not to reduce its commitments there in any significant degree." The conclusion is that the United States is part of the world and, as Quigg demonstrates, critics of our foreign policy have failed to consider the consequences, even for our free society, should we abandon the field to those nations which have not renounced war.

Quigg's book will irritate a good many readers; the radical-liberals, for example, will come up with their usual knee-jerk reaction to any suggestion that not all of our policies in the postwar period have been iniquitous or failures. The book will find some criticism from even the defenders of our policies; Quigg is at times overly sensitive, particularly on our policies toward Vietnam, South Africa, and the Philippines. As an example, in admitting "errors" in the case of South Africa, Mr. Quigg seems unaware of the impressive arguments to the contrary presented by Charles Burton Marshall and Dean Acheson. Probably the greatest by-product of the book will be increased recognition of the difficulties of conducting foreign policy in a democracy. Administration officials in the United States have problems not even dreamed of in other nations. No one, for example, expects Moscow and Hanoi to let their people know what they are planning, but Washington is expected to reveal all details, moment by moment. Any hint of benefits from our policies for special interests in the United States arouses automatic denunciation; yet, as Dean Acheson once mentioned to this reviewer, the support of special interests in a good cause is not to be neglected, and the former Secretary of State recalled the Biblical injunction, "Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness." Quigg's understanding of the complexities—political and otherwise—in the foreign policy process will prove beneficial, as will his conclusion that America has carried out, in a praiseworthy manner, the duties and responsibilities belonging to the world's

biggest power. The alternative? As George Ball has asked, If the United States does not walk the world policeman's beat, who will?

Another recent book, by Raymond O'Connor, looks at the relationship between force and diplomacy in American history. † The connection is not always clearly defined; most, although not all, of O'Connor's chapters focus on fairly narrow, sometimes legalistic, applications of military pressure to achieve national objectives. "The correlation between military power and successful foreign policy is not generally understood," says O'Connor at the beginning of his book, and he launches into a survey of how force influenced diplomacy throughout the history of the United States. From this, the publisher's blurb draws the superficial observation that O'Connor challenges the traditional view of the United States as a peace-loving nation. This misleading statement is based on the author's examples of U.S. territorial acquisition by military force. Apart from the fact that most of these were enwrapped in political considerations and affected by the inexorable pressure of American settlers for more land, the statement ignores completely the biggest single addition to the territory of the original United States, the Louisiana Purchase, which was acquired, as Thomas A. Bailey has put it, "at one bloodless stroke."

O'Connor, a former naval officer who is now chairman of the history department at the University of Miami, begins a chapter entitled "Naval Strategy in the Twentieth Century" with a quotation, long enshrined in the canon of naval scriptures, from Sir Walter Raleigh: "Whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world, commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself." The courteous

Raleigh would surely not, at this late date, begrudge the author's getting in a good lick, right off the bat, for his cause. But the reader who wishes to find in this chapter an integration of naval strategy with the theme of current national security problems will be disappointed.*

We can concede that Admiral Mahan gave intellectual substance to the strategy of control of the sea. But the future interaction of force and diplomacy that will set the proper strategy for this country can no more be based on Mahan alone than on Clausewitz alone for land or Douhet alone for air, each to the exclusion of the other two. This does not daunt Professor O'Connor, however, and the thesis of this chapter forms yet another in the currently fashionable array of assertions that we should adopt what has been referred to as a "blue water strategy."

O'Connor makes a valid point in his statement that "Russia, not surprisingly, has emerged as a rival to American naval dominance, and her efforts should be viewed in light of the competition on the international scene and the virtual equilibrium prevailing in other dimensions of military activity." It does not follow, however, that the author's summation in the final paragraph of the chapter is true:

. . . it is difficult to avoid concluding that the strategic significance of sea power has increased, most notably in its impact on land warfare. It is now capable of operating inland, with an even greater potential for what is called "blackmail" and for affecting the outcome of wars, either unconventional, limited or general.

What is not addressed by O'Connor, and should be in an analysis of force and diplomacy, is the extent to which in today's world the United States must pursue control of "sea lanes" to achieve its national security objectives. Herman Finer, one of our most eminent political scientists, has noted that in 1917 Wal-

*Colonel Gerald J. Carey, now attending the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, provided me with useful comments on this chapter.

†Raymond G. O'Connor, *Force and Diplomacy: Essays Military and Diplomatic* (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1972, \$10.00), 167 pages.

ter Lippmann called for the United States to enter World War I because at that time he thought sea power was decisive in America's survival and the new seagoing power was Imperial Germany. "It is a danger to America . . ." says Professor Finer, to hark "back to Mahan's teachings, without multiplying 20 knots by 350, and without multiplying the power of poor shots of dynamite by megatonic nuclear explosive and radioactive force." Finer's statement was an attack on the neo-isolationism of Lippmann and many other critics of U.S. "globalism" in the post-World War II period, so he stressed the time contraction posed by the nuclear threat to our security. His point is just as valid with regard to the wide-ranging capabilities of air power, whether or not it is accompanied by nuclear weapons.

Seven of O'Connor's chapters were prepared in their original form under a contract with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. They deal principally with the technical aspects of disarmament and the use of sanctions to enforce international agreements. Far more interesting are the next two chapters. One, "Roosevelt and Churchill: A Reinterpretation of the Diplomacy of World War II," is a lengthy defense of FDR's position on a second front, unconditional surrender, etc. It is intended to counteract what O'Connor calls the "conventional" interpretation of the diplomacy of the Second World War. That interpretation, according to O'Connor, contends that Roosevelt, unlike Churchill, "did not understand" the correlation between force and diplomacy, that the President was "obsessed with the military aspects of the war," ignored political objectives, prolonged the conflict, enabled the Soviet Union to shape the peace, and, finally, that he thus made it possible for the Soviets to dominate Eastern Europe and threaten the security of the Western World. O'Connor's opinion is that the reverse is more nearly correct. He argues that Churchill's policy of striking at the Germans from the periphery of Europe, the "indirect approach," was unsound, both milita-

rily and politically, and he blames Churchill, not FDR, for concessions to Russia that gave her a stronger postwar position in Europe. To this reviewer, the evidence presented by O'Connor for assigning to Churchill the responsibility for these "errors" of strategy is not conclusive. Even less substantial is his defense of the Allied policy of unconditional surrender toward the Axis powers. Here I think the weight of opinion is correct—that, as Bailey says, the unconditional surrender policy "greatly complicated" the reconstruction of enemy nations.

O'Connor's chapter on President Truman is by far the most useful—and welcome—in his book. Until recently, the great foreign policy initiatives of the Truman Administration—the Truman Doctrine, aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, and NATO—were regarded as statesmanlike applications of American strength in the interest of the free world's peace and prosperity. Academics and other intellectuals (who, despite their horror of dictatorship, are fond of extraordinary one-man initiative on the part of a President whose policies they support) had advanced Truman to the rank of the "near great" among Presidents. But fashions in Presidents change, just as fashions in nearly everything else; and with the disillusionment over Vietnam came a broader disenchantment with the image of America as the champion of the free world, with consequent downgrading of the efforts taken by Truman to reconstruct Europe after the war and to use American support in protecting other nations from Communist aggression. Truman's reputation as a President slipped as a result, just as did that of Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson later. O'Connor's assessment, then, is all the more refreshing, coming as it does while the breast-beating of so many of our liberal intellectuals is at its loudest and their little-America policies are thrust continuously in the public eye.

O'Connor ticks off six dimensions in which Truman's exercise of Presidential power or influence defined American national security policy:

1. *Control over nuclear weapons.* Truman, the only President who ever directed the actual employment of atomic bombs, in World War II, set the precedent for America's policy of restraint with respect to them thereafter; in fact, he bent over backwards to avoid waving them as a "big stick." O'Connor's only criticism of Truman's policies comes in this general area: the President's abnegation of nuclear weapons was not accompanied by a corresponding beefing up of American conventional forces to carry out our foreign policy objectives in Europe and the Far East. As the author says, Truman, "by failing to coordinate American capabilities with American commitments, endangered security and world peace."

2. *U.S. assumption of unilateral responsibility for protection of the free world.* Here O'Connor notes that the American response to the Berlin blockade was "as near complete an exercise of executive prerogative as the nation had seen since the end of World War II." It revealed, he says, that the future of resistance to Communism would be determined in the White House.

3. *New machinery for the formulation and execution of defense and foreign policy.* This included the Department of Defense and the National Security Council. As O'Connor says, the new machinery, under Truman's manipulation, "augmented the powers of the president in international affairs, and the precedents established by Truman in the utilization of this machinery were not ignored by his successors."

4. *U.S. assumption of the task of promoting world prosperity.* The Anglo-American Financial Agreement and the Marshall Plan were the key measures here. O'Connor rightly stresses the landmark nature of Congressional approval of the Marshall Plan, the first of the giant peacetime foreign aid programs. He lists some of the factors involved and calls the President the "one absolutely essential figure" in the promotion and adoption of the proposal. O'Connor is correct in this, and he recognizes Truman's superb orchestration of individuals and circumstances in the Marshall Plan effort.

All of this is pertinent, but I think the author might have made more of the widespread fear in 1947 and 1948 of a Russian take-over in the war-devastated, poverty-stricken nations of Western Europe. As Senator Everett M. Dirksen, a leader in the House at the time, once told this reviewer, fear of such a take-over was the determining factor in the Congressional decision to pass the Marshall Plan.

5. *Conclusion of a series of military or quasi-military alliances.* The North Atlantic Treaty was the principal instrument among these, and, as in the case of the Marshall Plan, O'Connor's discussion focuses on the careful efforts of the executive branch to work with the Senate in bringing about final approval of the treaty. The author notes here another example of Truman's expanding the Presidential authority as commander-in-chief to encompass the peacetime disposal of forces to meet the obligations of a military alliance. It was feared that the Russians, taking advantage of the Korean War, would attack Western Europe, so Truman, without asking Congressional approval, sent four American divisions across the Atlantic. In a way, he was "bailed out" by the Korean crisis itself, which resulted in legislation calling for a rapid expansion of the American military establishment.

6. *Membership in the United Nations.* Truman strengthened the "embryonic organization," as O'Connor calls it, by his commitment of American forces to the defense of South Korea. The whole Korean experience enlarged the role of the President in the conduct of national security affairs. The author uses it as a departure point for his conclusions on how Truman increased Presidential power in response to the expanded scope of action demanded of the President in foreign and military affairs. Truman, says O'Connor, "added new dimensions of power commensurate with America's strength and her pre-eminent position in international affairs."

O'Connor's final chapter, on victory in modern war, is a trivial, pedestrian summary of

how victory was accomplished in selected wars from the American Revolution on. The author's attempted distinction between "military" and "negotiated" settlements is fuzzy, to say the least. Particularly distressing is his unfortunate misconception of the Boer War, which began, says the author, "when the Boer settlers revolted against their colonial master, Great Britain." Nothing could be farther from the truth. The Boers were settled in two independent, long-established interior African republics, and they were the ones who declared war against Great Britain in 1899 and invaded Britain's Cape Colony. We do not need to go into the causes here, but obviously they were out of the author's ken.

The entire book is marred by the awkward, disjointed style that is frequently the characteristic of a book made up of essays written originally for other, particular purposes. There are other minor errors (e.g., in chronology), and proofreading errors abound. In the product of a university press, these are wondrous, to say the least, and someone should tell its proofreaders how to spell "casualties."

The merit of both these books (although Quigg's is the better by far) is that both authors recognize U.S. responsibilities to the rest of the world, and they do not see the U.S. role as completely invidious and destructive. Irresponsible critics argue that we should not become involved or that we should become involved only where their own particular "moral" judgment calls for it. But, as John P. Roche has pointed out, a moralist cannot play favorites. If there is one reason for us to support the black liberation of Rhodesia and South Africa, there are a hundred reasons for "liberals" to support the liberation of Russia, China, and North Vietnam. As police states go, says Roche, the U.S.S.R. makes Rhodesia and South Africa look like amateur performers.

Some people say we can do as Britain and France, which have fallen from their status of

Great Powers; and they blandly compare the future decline of the United States with the precipitous fall of Great Britain after World War II. Not so bad, they say. But the situation of the United States with respect to the rest of the world now is a great deal different from what Britain's was. Britain could recede from her empire and her obligations, for there was the United States, ready to pick up the torch. But if *we* draw down and in, who then will protect the rest of the world? Or, for that matter, who will protect us?

The truth is, as Morton Kaplan says, "the world is becoming so closely interrelated that the United States with its huge political, economic, ideological, and social power cannot avoid affecting the destinies of people in the remotest parts of the world. It does so whether it intervenes or fails to intervene. Almost any decision it makes is in effect a form of intervention." What about efforts to "sanitize" our intervention by providing assistance multilaterally or through the United Nations? These, Kaplan asserts, could have much worse consequences than unilateral American aid.

But aid, in itself, will not be enough if it is only economic or diplomatic. Military force will be required occasionally—and not only the nuclear power meant to be used as a deterrent. Fighting forces must be maintained—and used, at times—to throw the weight of the United States on the side of international order. If we eschew an active diplomacy and the occasional use of force in the interest of the peace-loving nations, the alternatives will be grim. The United Nations, as the *Manchester Guardian* says, is too weak to replace the alliances of the "American era," and who else will feed the millions of starving people we have aided? Not the United Nations, which is unprepared and divided, and not any foreseeable combination of the democratic nations. The power is still ours, and although the glory has faded, our duty remains.

Arlington, Virginia

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The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "Soviet Policy in Latin America" by Major Michael A. Nelson, USAF, as the outstanding article in the November-December 1972 issue of the *Air University Review*.

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